Corruption perceptions versus corruption incidence: Competition for rents across Russian regions

This paper examines the effects of different competitions for favors on the prevalence and perceptions of corruption across Russian regions. Results show that while greater general competition (measured by regional population size), increases both perceived and actual corruption, competition among enterprises only increases corruption perceptions, while competition among government employees increases actual, but not perceived, corruption. Privatization activity and unemployment fail to affect either measure of corruption. Finally, the effects of urbanization differ on perceived and actual corruption. Besides Russia, these findings are somewhat unique to the broader literature.     

Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games

Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10 min.     

Trade Integration with the European Union: Poverty Impacts in Ecuador

The government of Ecuador is seeking to negotiate a trade agreement with the European Union (EU). This study examines the impacts of such a trade agreement on rural and urban poverty in Ecuador by combining a household income and occupational choice model with a computable general equilibrium model. The results suggest that a trade agreement with the EU may have a significant impact on poverty. However, the nature and extent of the impact varies depending on the degree of initial tariff reduction, labor market considerations, and whether Ecuadorian bananas are granted better access to the EU market.     

The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems

Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank-dependent utility theory. Under rank-dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker. The same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion: utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. The main finding is that these two forms can have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that exhibit a weak monotonicity property. In particular, in a large class of bargaining problems both increased utility risk aversion and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent are advantagous for a player. This is demonstrated for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution does not behave regularly in this respect.     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

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An index of loss aversion

To a considerable extent, risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion. Several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature. The one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components: basic utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion. The index is independent of the unit of payment. The main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices.     

The Trade-off Between Quantity and Quality of Information in Gender Responses to Advertising

Unlike females, males tend to process informational ads in a heuristic manner and form their judgments based on the mere number of product assertions presented in a message. Consistent with this prediction, there was a positive linear relationship between argument quantity and message persuasiveness for males, and it persisted even when brand attributes conveyed in an ad were relatively unimportant. Alternatively, females' responses exhibited an S-shaped relationship between argument quantity and advertising effectiveness, and were affected by the strength of message claims. The author argued that this pattern occurred because females engaged in more detailed yet selective processing of advertising information.     

Protest Campaigns and Corporations: Cooperative Conflicts?

This article analyses and systematises the repertoires of action and reaction within conflicts between corporations and adversarial campaigns. Particular attention is paid to the parameters that turn conflicts between corporations and their critics into productive or destructive exchanges. Are protest campaigns able to fulfil a function that goes beyond serving as a seismograph for civil society’s concern and discontent? Which are the circumstances that enable conflicts between protest campaigns and corporations to unfold their potential for correcting social deficiencies? The analysis starts by outlining several typologies of confrontational and cooperative repertoires of action. Based on this starting point, a comprehensive analysis of more than 100 campaigns is presented, which systematises the dynamics of conflict between protest campaigns and corporations. An exemplary comparison of two particular conflicts completes the article in order to elaborate on the interplay between confrontation and cooperation.