Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms

This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.     

Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good

Most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions. Customers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others. Their choices affect firms' incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers' choices. We characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics, and consumers are heterogeneous ex‐ante. Consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm's investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire. Cheaper information affects consumers' information gathering and thereby firm investment. This can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits, and welfare.     

Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers

This article examines how in a context of limited enforceabilityof contracts suppliers may have a comparative advantage overbanks in lending to customers because they are able to stopthe supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may act also asliquidity providers, insuring against liquidity shocks thatcould endanger the survival of their customer relationships.The relatively high implicit interest rates of trade creditare the result of insurance and default premiums that are amplifiedwhenever suppliers face a relatively high cost of funds. I explorethese effects empirically for a panel of UK firms. (JEL: G30,M130, D920)     

Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing.     

Negative Libor rates in the swap market model

We apply Stroock and Varadhan’s support theorem to show that there is a positive probability that within the Swap Market Model the implied Libor rates become negative in finite time. Mataix-Pastor received support from the Instituto Credito Oficial (ICO), Spain, and Fundación Caja Madrid.     

Search Cost and Price Dispersion in Vertically Related Markets: The Case of Bank Loans and Deposits

Using data on marginal interest rates of loan and deposit products by Spanish banks, we find that the level of interest rates on loans (deposits) across geographic markets decrease (increase) with the number of banks in each market, and that the level of interest rates on loans increases with the level of interest rates of deposits. We also find that the dispersion of interest rates of both loans and deposits increase with the number of banks. This evidence is interpreted as evidence of customer’s search costs in retail banking, consistent with predictions from the Carlson and McAfee (J Polit Econ 91:480–493, 1983) model of market competition with search costs.     

Institutional Constraints,Stakeholder Pressure and Corporate Environmental Reporting Policies

Within the theoretical framework of socio‐political economics, and more specifically of stakeholder theory, this work examines whether companies operating under different institutional constraints and stakeholder pressure tend to emphasize different models of corporate environmental reporting. Furthermore, the paper tests whether different corporate environmental reporting policies are driven by the countries' corporate governance systems. A sample of 3931 international companies was examined through a logistic biplot and conditional mean linear regression models. The main results reveal that companies follow two distinct environmental reporting approaches, which depend on specific stakeholders and institutional requirements. The first model, which is followed by firms within codified law countries, mostly focuses on water and emissions. The second approach, mainly followed by companies operating in common law countries, emphasizes materials and energy issues. This finding reveals that companies gradually modify their environmental strategies to make themselves more compatible with the characteristics of the social and institutional environment, which will result in several corporate benefits. The paper provides several outstanding implications for companies' strategic managers, national institutions and firms' stakeholders, especially for investors and customers. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Institutional capacity to dynamically innovate: An application to the Portuguese case

The present paper addresses the dynamics of innovation, by extending the analysis beyond a static-economic perspective. It offers a dynamic-institutional mapping of relational capacities to dynamically innovate. Its main goal is to contribute to the above-mentioned research theme by presenting a new methodology able to pinpoint different trends in the relational capacities of institutions when they are innovative. Thereby, major characteristics in the networks of innovation are identified. This investigation uses an extended set of private institutions and public organizations located in Portugal, evaluated by their WebPage contents. To this data set a new combination of multivariate statistical methods is applied to detect group performances, to compare them, and to identify gradients of capacity to dynamically innovate. The results demonstrate that this method can provide extremely useful and tailor-made information for policy evaluation at regional or national levels.     

Cointegration with structural changes between per capita product and income inequality in Mexico

The long-run relationship between per capita product and income inequality in Mexico is assessed for the period 1963–2010. The methodology consists of stochastic unit root techniques with structural changes. The integration and cointegration tests suggest that it is not possible to understand this link if the possibility of structural changes is not taken into account. Causality, running from per capita product to income inequality, and a negative and significant overall effect are estimated. However, after the regime shifts – mainly estimated to occur in the 1980s – the connection is no longer meaningful. This result seems to be linked to the slow growth of the Mexican economy after these structural breaks, affecting, in turn, the reductions in income inequality.