The Distorting Impact of Capital Controls

Abstract. This paper uses panel data to show that capital controls have a significant impact on international interest rate differentials. Various types of controls can be distinguished within the data. The analysis shows that the aforementioned effects of capital controls on interest rates are especially strong in the case of capital import controls on portfolio capital; the implementation of these controls has been suggested in the wake of the Asian Crisis to prevent further crises. The results presented herein contradict the hypothesis that capital controls can achieve a restructuring of the maturity of capital inflows without a distortion in international capital allocation.     

A Note on Forecasting Emerging Market Exchange Rates: Evidence of Anti‐herding

Using survey forecasts of a large number of Asian, European, and South American emerging market exchange rates, we studied empirically whether evidence of herding or anti‐herding behavior of exchange‐rate forecasters can be detected in the cross‐section of forecasts. Emerging market exchange‐rate forecasts are consistent with herding (anti‐herding) if forecasts are biased towards (away from) the consensus forecast. Our empirical findings provide strong evidence of anti‐herding of emerging market exchange‐rate forecasters.     

When Does Everyone Contribute in the Private Provision of Local Public Goods?

When does everyone genuinely contribute in the private provision of a local public good? We first introduce a monotonic condition to characterize the relationship between the structure of the network that underlie the noncooperative game of private provision of local public goods on the one hand, and the preferences of the agents on the other, showing that the monotonic condition is a sufficient and necessary condition of existence of a distributed Nash equilibrium (DNE) in which each agent exerts a positive amount of effort to provision of the public good (Theorem 1). We then study the number of equilibria, and, by using the monotonic condition, characterize the condition under which the DNE set is a singleton, a continuum, or null (Theorem 2). As it turns out, the structure of the network and the agents’ preferences jointly shape the effort profile in the provision of local public goods.     

On Welfare Criteria and Optimality in an Endogenous Growth Model

In this paper, we explore the consequences for optimality of a social planner adopting two different welfare criteria. The framework of analysis is an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital. We first show that, when the social welfare function is a discounted sum of individual utilities defined over consumption per unit of natural labor, the precise cardinalization of the individual utility function becomes crucial for both the characterization of the social optimum and the policies that support it. Also, decentralizing the social optimum requires an education subsidy that is definitely positive, but its size depends in a determinant way on the aforementioned cardinalization. In contrast, when the social welfare function is a discounted sum of individual utilities defined over consumption per unit of efficient labor, the precise cardinalization of preferences becomes irrelevant. More strikingly, along the optimal growth path, the education subsidy is negative, i.e., the planner should tax rather than subsidize investments in human capital.     

LABOR MOBILITY OF IMMIGRANTS: TRAINING,EXPERIENCE, LANGUAGE,AND OPPORTUNITIES*

This article analyzes the labor mobility and human capital accumulation of male immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel. We estimate a dynamic choice model for employment and training in blue‐ and white‐collar occupations, where the labor market randomly offered opportunities are affected by past choices. The estimated model accurately reproduces the patterns in the data. The estimated direct earning return to local training, local experience, and knowledge of Hebrew are very high, whereas imported skills have zero (conditional) return. The welfare gain from the impact of training on job offer probabilities is larger than its effect on wages.     

Total‐Factor Energy and Emission Efficiencies of ASEAN and Other Asian Economies

This research uses the slack‐based measure data envelopment analysis to compute the energy and emission efficiencies of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other Asian economies during the 2001–2017 period, employs the Malmquist productivity index to check for the main source of efficiency score changes due to technical changes, and then applies panel Tobit regressions to determine the factors explaining the efficiencies. Our empirical results show that the energy efficiency scores of ASEAN economies had been catching up to other Asian economies after the Global Financial Crisis, whereas the emission efficiency scores of various ASEAN economies had been falling behind other Asian economies over the same period. The main source of efficiency score changes over time is efficiency changes and not technical changes. Decreases in the fossil fuel ratio of net electricity generation and the secondary industry ratio within total industry improve both lead to improvements in energy and emission efficiencies.     

Natural resources,technological progress,and economic modernization

The present inquiry focuses on the modernization perspectives of the commodity‐exporting countries through the lens of development economics. To this end, the study adopts the Kaldorian framework to address the modernization effects, epitomized in the absorption of surplus labor. To trace the process of economic modernization, the study augments Lewis’s dualistic economy model by the extractive sector. Three different scenarios for the management of resource revenues are scrutinized. An altruistic mode, which implies a pure redistribution of the revenues among the poor swaths of the population, protracts the process of economic modernization, requires a greater amount of capital stock, and harbors a greater risk of a poverty trap. This effect is less pronounced if the modern sector is more capital‐intensive. A productive mode, which elicits full reinvestment of the commodity revenues, in contrast, accelerates the pace of economic modernization. Further, predicated on the scrutiny of a more realistic scenario, a bargaining mode, the study derives the condition for a net positive (or negative) modernization effect. The study identifies technical progress alongside capital accumulation as a further important source of economic modernization.     

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS: WHY IS THE INCOME SHARE OF TOP INCOME EARNERS ACYCLICAL OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE?

In the United States, the income share of the top 5% income group is acyclical over the business cycle. This study attempts to explain the cyclical behavior of the income distribution over the business cycle, particularly focusing on the top 5% income earners' share, using a heterogeneous agent model featuring a choice to become an entrepreneur. The model economy successfully reproduces the acyclical behavior of the income share of the top 5%. During expansions, relatively more people become entrepreneurs at the top, which offsets the decline in the income share of the high‐income earners from workers' side.     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.