Pooling, separating, and semiseparating equilibria in financial markets: some experimental evidence

This study investigates experimental financial markets in whichfirms possess more information than do potential investors.Firms were given opportunities to undertake positive net presentvalue projects which they could either forgo or finance by sellingequity. Auctions were conducted among the investors for theright to finance the projects. When the theoretical equilibriumwas unique, theory predicted well. When theory permitted pooling,separation, and semiseparation, only the more efficient poolingequilibrium was observed. The domination of the pooling equilibriumwas robust to different experimental experiences by participants.When available, signals were used by good firms to distinguishthemselves from bad.     

Stock Market Development and Financing Choices of Firms

In many developing countries with emerging stock markets, banksare fearful of stock market development because they think thatstock markets will reduce the volume of their business. Thisarticle empirically analyzes the effects of stock market developmenton firms' financing choices using data from thirty developingand industrial countries from 1980 to 1991. The results implythat initial improvements in the functioning of a developingstock market produce a higher debt-equity ratio for firms andthus more business for banks. In stock markets that are alreadydeveloped, further development leads to a substitution of equityfor debt financing. By contrast, in developing stock markets,large firms become more levered as the stock market develops,whereas small firms do not appear to be significantly affectedby stock market development.     

Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms

This paper investigates whether Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a mechanism by which insolvent firms are efficiently reorganized and the assets of unproductive firms are effectively redeployed. We argue that incentives to reorganize depend on the level of demand and industry conditions. Using plant-level data, we find that Chapter 11 status is much less important than industry conditions in explaining the productivity, asset sales, and closure conditions of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms. This suggests that firms that elect to enter into Chapter 11 incur few real economic costs.     

Structuring the Initial Offering: Who to Sell To and How to Do It

We develop a unified model of the issuer’s decisions that takes into account both mechanism design and adverse selection risk. The model enables us to determine the optimal amount of information gathering prior to setting the offer price, and to understand what does and does not cause underpricing. The flexibility to allocate securities between a pool of investors who provide pricingrelevant information and investors who do not provide information is key to controlling underpricing. Policies that guarantee a minimum allocation to investors in the pool result in underpricing; policies that cap the allocations to such investors do not. The optimal number of investors in the pool, and thus the amount of information acquired, generally increases with the riskiness of the issue. However, this relation breaks down if pool members are guaranteed minimum allocations.We are grateful to the referees and the editor, Marco Pagano, for their insightful suggestions. We thank Sugato Bhattacharyya, Jos von Bommel, Zhoahui Chen, Robert Hauswald, Dilip Madan, Kristian Rydqvist, Alex Stomper, Meg Van De Weghe, Ivo Welch and participants at Carnegie Mellon, Indiana University, the University of Maryland, Tulane University and Yale University finance seminars for their helpful comments. This paper has evolved from an earlier paper titled Private versus Public Offerings: Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Adverse Selection, that was presented at the 1999 Western Finance Association meetings.     

Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Resources Inefficiently Across Industries? Theory and Evidence

We develop a profit-maximizing neoclassical model of optimal firm size and growth across different industries based on differences in industry fundamentals and firm productivity. In the model, a conglomerate discount is consistent with profit maximization. The model predicts how conglomerate firms will allocate resources across divisions over the business cycle and how their responses to industry shocks will differ from those of single-segment firms. Using plant level data, we find that growth and investment of conglomerate and single-segment firms is related to fundamental industry factors and individual segment level productivity. The majority of conglomerate firms exhibit growth across industry segments that is consistent with optimal behavior.     

Capital Structure, Information Acquisition and Investment Decisions in an Industry Framework

This paper analyzes the relationship between a firm's capital structure and its information acquisition prior to capital budgeting decisions. It is found that low-growth industries can sustain a large number of levered firms. In these industries, leverage is negatively related to a firm's incentive to acquire information during the capital budgeting process. In contrast, high-growth industries only sustain a small number of levered firms. In these industries, levered firms acquire more information than all-equity financed firms. The model yields empirical predictions regarding the effects of leverage on the expected amount and the volatility of corporate investment. While leverage does not affect firm value, highly levered firms generate a more volatile cash flow than firms with low debt levels.     

Financial policy and reputation for product quality

The effect of financial policy on a firm's incentives to maintainits reputation of producing a high-quality product is analyzed.It is demonstrated that in certain situations debt will reducea firm's ability to credibly offer high-quality products and,as a consequence, will reduce its value. However, for firmswith assets that have high salvage values in liquidation, debtmay increase their ability to credibly offer high-quality productsand, therefore, increase their values.