Illusion of control and the pursuit of authority

We measure participants’ willingness to pay for transparently useless authority—the right to make a completely uninformed task decision. We further elicit participants’ beliefs about receiving their preferred outcome if they make the decision themselves, and if another participant makes the decision for them. We find that participants pay more to make the decision themselves if they also believe that they can thus increase the probability of getting their preferred outcome. Illusion of control therefore exists in a controlled laboratory environment with monetary incentives and is connected to peoples’ pursuit of authority.     

"The Right Man": James A. Jackson and the Origins of U.S. Government Interest in Black Business

Despite the widely held notion that U.S. government assistanceto African American entrepreneurs commenced in the late 1960s,the evidence indicates that government interest in promotingblack business actually began in the 1920s. Beginning with theappointment of James A. Jackson in November 1927, the U.S. CommerceDepartment’s agenda, until the mid-1950s, included "NegroAffairs." Jackson’s actions did not generate the directfinancial assistance to black entrepreneurs associated withsuch later government initiatives as Richard Nixon’s "BlackCapitalism." Nevertheless, Jackson’s pioneering efforts,to provide black businesspeople with useful information, helpedto positively reshape contemporary African American entrepreneurs’beliefs about the role of government in their lives.     

Selection institutions and war aims

We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument. Received: June 2004, Accepted: April 2005, Correspondence to: James D. Morrow     

Does Making Specific Investments Unobservable Boost Investment Incentives?

Standard theory predicts that holdup can be alleviated by making specific investments unobservable; private information creates an informational rent that boosts investment incentives. Empirical findings, however, indicate that holdup is attenuated by fairness and reciprocity motivations. Private information may interfere with these, as it becomes impossible to observe whether the investor behaved fair or not. In that way unobservability could crowd out an informal fairness/reciprocity mechanism in place. This paper reports on an experiment to investigate this issue empirically. Our results are in line with standard predictions when there is limited scope for social preferences. But with sufficient scope for these motivational factors, unobservability does not boost specific investments.     

Financial aspects of motor carrier safety inspection performance

This paper investigates the empirical relationships between the safety performances and the financial conditions and management forms of a group of motor carriers. Unlike previous work, we utilize cash flow analyses and random, comprehensive roadside safety inspection results to measure financial status and safety performance, respectively, thus avoiding many criticisms of previous studies.Several probit models are specified and estimated by the method of moments technique. The results strongly suggest that firm financial status is an important predictor of firm safety performance, that closely-held firms exhibit substantially different behavior than other firms, that carriers respond to cargo-specific risks, and that some common safety inspection criteria seem to sensibly measure safety.     

The vriance of epected iflation and the rte oI inflation: implications from Inter-industry wage equations

To test the export-growth hypothesis for Ghana, four parametric causality models (the Granger model, the Sims model, the modified Sims model, the Akaike Final Prediction Error model) and the non-parametric multiple rank F-test model of Holmes and Hutton are estimated for a variety of variable specifications and lag structures. Consistent with other published research, causality conclusions are sensitive to the different causality tests used, to the lag specification of the variables and to the structure of the error terms. The interesting contribution of this research is in comparing results derived from parametric and non-parametric models and in showing that violation of the normality assumption leads the Granger model to the apparently incorrect conclusion that GDP causes exports.     

Price-Quality Tradeoffs and Welfare Effects in Cable Television Markets

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 reduced restrictions on the cable TV industry, providing completely deregulated rates in March 1999. Prior to that time the cable industry was generally allowed to increase rates so long as additional channels were supplied. In this paper we develop a simple tradeoff between price and quality in order to calculate the welfare tradeoff to consumers of the provision of one additional satellite channel. Gauging the impact of this quality change on consumers alone, we conclude that the increase in consumer gains due to an extra channel provision are almost exactly counterbalanced by reductions due to price increases. This ceteris paribus calculation does not mean, of course, that dynamic supply effects from the provision and availability of more channels will not increase future competition and potential consumer benefits.     

Special Interest Group Formation in the United States: Do Special Interest Groups Mirror the Success of their Spatial Neighbors?

Special interest groups exert a great deal of influence over political outcomes in the United States. Understanding the determining factors for the formation of special interest groups is important. However, the literature has excluded the role of spatial neighbors. This article employs spatial econometric techniques to discriminately analyze the factors determining the number of special interest groups in a state. While geographic location is not a factor, gross state product, state general expenditures, union membership, and the percentage of manufacturing employment relationships between states are crucial in the formation of special interest groups across states.     

Bounding consumer surplus by monopoly profits

Regulatory agencies and other public authorities in the United States frequently require private firms seeking regulatory approvals to enter geographic markets, or offer products, that they would not otherwise provide. Examples include “build-out” rules for cable television franchisees, and universal service or “common carrier” obligations. The social welfare consequences of such policies are often difficult to evaluate because, among other things, consumer surpluses generated by entry must be assessed. This article shows that the level of (variable) monopoly profits in the markets of interest can be used to place an upper bound on the associated consumer surplus whenever demand vanishes at a sufficiently high price. This result, which is new, can then be used to evaluate the social consequences of forced entry. Our methods can also be used to provide a bound on the change in consumer surplus resulting from the imposition of regulated prices on an existing monopoly.      

Revolutionizing the workplace: A case study of the future of work program at Capital One

Today's workplace designs are being revolutionized due to the changing nature of work and worker profiles, the impact of technology, and the need for organizational efficiency and flexibility. Our case study of the Future of Work (FOW) program at Capital One highlights how thoughtful segmentation of work styles, supportive HR policy, customized workplace design, and the optimal use of technology can enhance knowledge work. FOW results show clear success in terms of increased employee satisfaction leading to improved organizational performance along with better real estate asset utilization and flexibility. To assist HR leaders and planners, we suggest a practical model that shows the impact of workplace design requirements on employee behavior and ultimately on organizational outcomes. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.