Earnings Management Surrounding New Debt Issues

We examine whether firms manage earnings before issuing bonds to achieve a lower cost of borrowing. We find significant income‐increasing earnings management prior to bond offerings. We also find that firms that manage earnings upward issue debt at a lower cost, after controlling for various bond issuer and issue characteristics. Our results are consistent with studies that report earnings management around equity issuance. The results indicate that, like equity holders, bondholders fail to see through the inflated earnings numbers in pricing new debt.     

CEO duality,succession-planning and agency theory: research agenda

In response to Harris and Helfat's commentary on our article, ‘One hat too many: Key executive plurality and shareholder wealth,’ we suggest that their arguments are quite plausible, but we believe further empirical tests are needed. These proposed tests are described in our response. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory

A conceptual analysis of important issues in the organization and management of academic research is presented. Principal-agent theory is applied to derive optimal compensation schemes for scientists when they differ in ability, risk aversion, cost of effort, and reservation utility, and to show the optimal trade-off between institutional risk and scientists' abilities. Implications for an efficient organization of research are derived, including how scientists' incentives should be structured to elicit optimal research efforts and direction, whether research direction should be centralized or decentralized, and whether the organization of research should be through external competitive grants or program and institutional funding.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,turnover, and risk aversion

Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting.     

Investment Professionals' Ability to Detect Deception: Accuracy,Bias and Metacognitive Realism

In the first empirical study on the topic, the authors examined the ability of investment professionals to distinguish between truthful and deceptive statements. A random sample of 154 investment professionals made judgments about a series of truthful and deceptive statements, some of which involved financial fraud. Investment professionals' lie detection accuracy was poor; participants performed no better than would be expected by chance. Accuracy in identifying lies about financial fraud was especially poor. Further, participants displayed poor metacognitive realism when assessing their own performance. The theoretical and practical implications for lie detection in the financial industry are discussed.     

The real exchange rate,regime changes and volatility shifts

We make use of a data-set with both long span and high frequency to test for purchasing power parity (PPP) while allowing for a structural shift in the volatility of the Mexico–US bilateral real exchange rate (RER). The Kim, Leybourne and Newbold (2002) unit root test, robust to changes in the innovation variance, indicates mean stationarity of the monthly RER, and hence evidence of PPP, for the full sample, 1930–2012, and various subsamples. The persistence of deviations of the real rate from its PPP level as measured by half-lives ranges from 1.37 to 2.41 years.