国际经验借鉴下的武义温泉养生旅游发展研究

随着社会进步和经济发展,温泉养生旅游产业正悄然崛起,浙中地区尤其是武义具备了良好的温泉养生文化旅游资源。研究武义县如何大力发展温泉养生旅游,借鉴日本等国际发展经验,创新性地提出具有武义特色的温泉养生旅游发展模式,助推金华县域经济转型升级。     

风险管理系统在出口水产品检验检疫中的应用

从风险管理的理念出发,简要介绍了宁波检验检疫局开发的出口食品农产品风险管理系统和在出口水产品检验检疫监管中推行风险管理的探索历程。同时,以出口海水网箱养殖活鱼为例,引用矩阵评价法等风险评估方法,在对出口水产品风险要素及其风险等级进行全面评估的基础上,将出口水产品纳入风险管理系统加以应用。通过应用前后的抽检率、抽检项目数量、不合格检出率等检验检疫数据比较,得出系统的应用可以实现科学把关的结论,使出口水产品的检验检疫工作更加科学、合理、高效,监管水平进一步提升。     

Sharing the value‐at‐risk under distributional ambiguity

This paper considers the problem of risk sharing, where a coalition of homogeneous agents, each bearing a random cost, aggregates their costs, and shares the value‐at‐risk of such a risky position. Due to limited distributional information in practice, the joint distribution of agents' random costs is difficult to acquire. The coalition, being aware of the distributional ambiguity, thus evaluates the worst‐case value‐at‐risk within a commonly agreed ambiguity set of the possible joint distributions. Through the lens of cooperative game theory, we show that this coalitional worst‐case value‐at‐risk is subadditive for the popular ambiguity sets in the distributionally robust optimization literature that are based on (i) convex moments or (ii) Wasserstein distance to some reference distributions. In addition, we propose easy‐to‐compute core allocation schemes to share the worst‐case value‐at‐risk. Our results can be readily extended to sharing the worst‐case conditional value‐at‐risk under distributional ambiguity.     

Impact of Decision Rules and Non-cooperative Behaviors on Minimum Consensus Cost in Group Decision Making

Group Decision and Negotiation - In group decision making, it is sensible to achive minimum consensus cost (MCC) because the consensus reaching process resources are often limited. In this...     

区域企业结构差异对我国货币政策区域效应的影响

本文通过建立回归面板数据模型,证实了企业数量对经济增长有很大的促进作用,然后通过建立SVAR模型,检验了各种规模企业对货币政策的相应作用,结果显示我国中小型企业对货币政策比较敏感,特别是中型企业最为敏感.由于我国区域之间企业结构存在较大差异,这必然会产生货币政策区域效应.     

中国作为碳交易大国为何缺乏定价权?

2005年以来,全球碳交易市场持续快速扩张,作为碳排放大国和非减排义务国的中国,已成为全球碳减排资源供给大国,但始终处于碳交易价值链的最低端,在为发达国家提供了巨量减排资源的同时向它们输送了巨额经济利益。其原因在于中国缺乏碳交易定价权。本文深入研究了此问题,认为根源在于资源意识、交易主体、交易市场、交易标的和交易货币等方面的劣势。为改善中国碳交易定价地位,中国应提升碳资源认识、完善碳交易体系、构建碳金融体系。     

广东省农产品质量安全监管体系的现状、问题与对策

农产品质量安全问题关系到广大人民群众的生命安全,随着人们生活水平的提高,对农产品质量的要求越来越高,从"吃饱"向"吃好"转变,农产品质量安全越来越受到人们的广泛关注。然而,由农产品质量安全问题引发的食源性疾病还时有发生,因此,进一步提高农产品质量安全监管成为当务之急。本文分析了目前广东省农产品质量安全监管体系,包括农产品质量管理机构、检测机构、监测工作及相关制度建设的现状,同时指出该体系存在的问题,对加快完善农产品质量安全监管体系建设提出相应的对策建议。     

大庆地区地热资源勘探与开发利用的探讨

地热资源将成为21世纪的主要能源之一。地热资源开采成本低 ,工业回报率高 ,在发电、采暖、医疗等领域具有广泛的用途。本文介绍了大庆地区地热资源勘探开发现状、存在的问题及发展前景 ,指出大庆作为以油气资源生产为主的城市 ,随着丰富地热资源的有效开发和利用 ,必将进一步推动大庆地区的可持续发展     

结合全双工与协作干扰的无线网状网物理层安全策略

针对无线网状网中缺少窃听者先验知识不利场景中的安全连接问题,提出了一种结合全双工和协作干扰技术的物理层安全策略。利用全双工通信中的自干扰消除技术和协作干扰技术,提出的安全策略可有效劣化位于信息传播范围内包括潜伏在接收节点附近窃听者的接收性能。为保证信息的安全传输给出了协作干扰节点的选择方法,基于随机几何等数学方法导出了选定路径的安全连接概率表达式。性能分析和仿真结果表明,所提方法与仅基于全双工或协作干扰技术的方法相比,其安全性能有较大提升。     

The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation

This paper addresses the evolution of cooperation in a multi-agent system with agents interacting heterogeneously with each other based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. The heterogeneity of interaction is defined in two models. First, agents in a network are restricted to interacting with only their neighbors (local interaction). Second, agents are allowed to adopt different IPD strategies against different opponents (discriminative interaction). These two heterogeneous interaction scenarios are different to the classical evolutionary game, in which each agent interacts with every other agent in the population by adopting the same strategy against all opponents. Moreover, agents adapt their risk attitudes while engaging in interactions. Agents with payoffs above (or below) their aspirations will become more risk averse (or risk seeking) in subsequent interactions, wherein risk is defined as the standard deviation of one-move payoffs in the IPD game. In simulation experiments with agents using only own historical payoffs as aspirations (historical comparison), we find that the whole population can achieve a high level of cooperation via the risk attitude adaptation mechanism, in the cases of either local or discriminative interaction models. Meanwhile, when agents use the population’s average payoff as aspirations (social comparison) for adapting risk attitudes, the high level of cooperation can only be sustained in a portion of the population (i.e., partial cooperation). This finding also holds true in both of the heterogeneous scenarios. Considering that payoffs cannot be precisely estimated in a realistic IPD game, simulation experiments are also conducted with a Gaussian disturbance added to the game payoffs. The results reveal that partial cooperation in the population under social comparison is more robust to the variation in payoffs than the global cooperation under historical comparison.