Measuring the economic benefit from R&D: results from the mass, length and flow programmes of the UK national measurement system

This study sought to measure the economic consequences of reduced expenditure on specific sections of the UK National Measurement System (NMS), part of the state-funded technological infrastructure. A method was developed which can be adapted to any publicly or privately financed R&D of which the benefits and cost-effectiveness are unclear or contested.
The recent interactions between the NMS and industry were investigated empirically. Five mechanisms were found to account for the majority of instances of successful value creation. Several case studies of each mechanism were collected, illustrating their existence beyond reasonable doubt.
Each of the cut projects would have been expected to have encouraged growth and profitability in identified sectors of the economy through one or more of these five mechanisms. The effects of the cuts were modelled over 30 years. Compared to the costs of the cut projects projected over the same period, the benefits to the economy were predicted to exceed the costs.     

Inflation and monetary regimes

Correlations of inflation with the growth rate of money increase when data are averaged over longer time periods. Correlations of inflation with the growth of money also are higher when high inflation as well as low-inflation countries are included in the analysis. We show that serial correlation in the underlying inflation rate ties these two observations together and explains them. We present evidence that averaging increases the correlation of inflation and money growth in more when the underlying inflation rate has higher serial correlation.     

Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results

Of late, concern has been expressed that American managers tend to make decisions that yield short-term gains at the expense of the long-term interests of the shareholders. In this paper, we have attempted to investigate managerial incentives for such decisions. We find that, when the manager has private information regarding his or her decisions, there exist situations wherein the manager has incentives to make decisions which yield short-term profits but are not in the stockholders best interests. This incentive for suboptimal decisions arises because the manager, by taking decisions yielding short-term profits, hopes to enhance his reputation earlier, thus boosting his wages. We also find that this incentive is inversely related to her experience, the duration of her contract, and the risk of the firm.     

The dynamics of economic systems,or how to transform a failed socialist economy

How to transform a failed socialist economy raises questions about the processes of structural and institutional changes, which standard economics is inadequately equipped to study. An economic theory that can study both these processes is suggested and applied to the actual debate of how the transformation should be conducted. Standard notions of institutional roles (R) and organizational structures (S) are seen in a non-standard way as outcomes of two interrelated but distinct evolutions. Comparing different given Rs for their influence on S-evolution throws new light on which R should be the target of the transformation. Compared to standard analysis, the case against socialism on the supply side is strengthened, whereas the case against a redistributive welfare society on the demand side is weakened. S-evolution is shown to require more time and be more difficult to be helped by government than R-evolution. This clarifies several controversial points about the speed and the sequencing of the transformation policies. The study of R-evolution discloses an important cognitive constraint on these policies, which teaching of economics can help to soften. Standard economics, shown to be a special case of the suggested theory, is rehabilitated as the best subject by which such teaching should start.     

Real exchange rate behavior

Using random simulations with artificial data with identical sample characteristics to the long-sample exchange rate data employed by Lothian and Taylor (Lothian, J.R. and Taylor, M.P. (1996). The recent float from the perspective of the past two centuries. Journal of Political Economy 104, 488–509.), we show that standard unit-root tests have extremely low power over sample sizes corresponding to the recent float. The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false is extremely low with 20 years or even 50 years of data and only reaches an acceptable level over much longer spans.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Multisector Model: The Price Consequences of Government Spending

This paper investigates optimal fiscal policy in a static multisector model. A Ramsey type planner chooses tax rates on each good type as well as spending levels on each good type subject to an exogenous total expenditure constraint. It is shown that, like taxes, government spending policy has price effects and that these price effects have significant implications for optimal policy. These price effects imply a U shape to the government's objective function and this U shape results in boundary values for the choice of the spending allocation. In particular, it is shown that the optimal allocation of government spending tends to be concentrated on one good rather than spread among many goods.     

Technology-forcing through environmental regulation

This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard.