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91.
Wilhelm Winkler 《Journal of Economics》1957,17(1):126-127
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
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Wilhelm Krelle 《Journal of Economics》1969,29(3-4):407-417
Ohne ZusammenfassungBesprechung des Buches Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, ed. by Martin Shubik, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1967. 相似文献
94.
Wilhelm Ruprecht 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2005,15(3):247-272
From a theoretical point of view, addressing the adoption of novelty and change in consumption is a topic of major interest since it challenges the axiomatic foundations of modern microeconomics. Starting from the “continuity hypothesis” which considers the evolution of culture to be based on biological evolution, an evolutionary approach is presented which highlights the role of consumer learning. By means of a case study on the complex consumption history of sweeteners, it is shown that this approach complements the Lancasterian characteristics approach to the adoption of novelty in consumption in a fruitful way.JEL Classification:
B52, D11, D12, Q13The author thanks Guido Buenstorf, Klaus Rathe and Ulrich Witt for helpful discussions and comments. 相似文献
95.
Efficient capital allocation in a market economy depends on the exchange of reliable information between providers of capital and companies that seek to put capital to work. One challenge, however, is that information exchange is at most only partly subject to verification and contractual arrangements. Take the case of securities issuance, including IPOs; whereas issuers of the new securities have incentives to overstate their prospects to attract higher bids, prospective investors have incentives to understate their interest. In principle, the counterparties could enter into an agreement that would prevent or discourage misrepresentations by both sides, but failure to perform would be very costly, if not impossible, for a court to verify. Investment banks have traditionally addressed this problem by creating extralegal markets for information whose functioning depends on the reputations of the banks for upholding the interests of both their corporate clients and the providers of capital. But committing to strike the right balance among all of the parties’ interests means that relational investment bankers inevitably face conflicts of interest. The authors of this article argue that such bankers exist to absorb and to manage conflicts of interest in financial markets—and that they do so by exercising judgment in ways that support their reputation for fair dealing. Modern full‐service investment banks, when addressing such conflicts, combine, or braid, such relational functions with technocratic banking activities involving the use of technical skills with advanced information technology. In so doing, however, technocratic bankers substitute formal contracts for the informal judgment exercised by relational bankers; and as a result, they are less dependent on their banks’ reputations for fair dealing. Moreover, technocratic bankers often have powerful incentives to pursue a personal reputation by executing complex transactions that demonstrate their skill, even at the expense of their clients and the bank's reputation for fair dealing. Well‐governed braided banks can benefit from complementarities between relational and technocratic skills. Nevertheless, full‐service banks continue to struggle with governance problems. The authors discuss several market responses to these struggles, such as the growing use of boutique banks offering “unconflicted” sell‐side advice in mergers and acquisitions and securities offerings. But the authors view such responses as at most a first step toward achieving a new understanding of the extent of the challenge facing today's investment banks in carrying out their economic function of bringing together and balancing the interests of companies and their investors. 相似文献
96.
Lawrence M. Benveniste Alexander Ljungqvist William J. Wilhelm Jr. Xiaoyun Yu 《The Journal of Finance》2003,58(2):577-608
We provide evidence that firms attempting IPOs condition offer terms and the decision whether to carry through with an offering on the experience of their primary market contemporaries. Moreover, while initial returns and IPO volume are positively correlated in the aggregate, the correlation is negative among contemporaneous offerings subject to a common valuation factor. Our findings are consistent with investment banks implicitly bundling offerings subject to a common valuation factor to achieve more equitable internalization of information production costs and thereby preventing coordination failures in primary equity markets. 相似文献
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This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history. 相似文献
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