Core Labor Standards and Competitiveness: Implications for Global Trade Policy

One of the principal arguments for inclusion of core labor standards in the WTO is that weak labor standards provide an illegitimate boost to competitiveness and may result in a "race to the bottom" in labor standards worldwide. This paper shows that, if the violation of labor standards results from discrimination against particular workers in export industries, employment, output, and competitiveness will be reduced since employment is determined by the short side of the market. If the problems arise from abuse of market power by employers, competitiveness will be similarly reduced. Only if freedom of association and collective bargaining were intended to allow workers in some sectors to restrict output and drive up wages would the absence of these standards raise competitiveness. However, if product markets are competitive, it is likely that association rights would increase output and competitiveness by raising productivity. The competitiveness argument seems either to reflect analytical confusion or to represent a cover for protectionist interests.     

BPR—overcoming impediments to change in the public sector

Here the author examines the extent of BPR practice across UK government, reaching conclusions about overcoming impediments which arise in organizational change processes.     

Six Stakeholding Propositions

Will Hutton is one of the leading proponents of the stakeholding concept. He originally set out his ideas in an earlier book, "The State We're In". In this article, he summarises the arguments contained in his latest book, "The State to Come". He discusses six stakeholding propositions: the same value systems apply in employment and other spheres of life; macroeconomic policy needs to tighten the demand for labour; a market economy needs democratic institutions that generate social capital, particularly trust; businesses function best on the basis of internal commitment and trust; "intermediate institutions" like universities need to generate social capital and provide a long-term perspective; and systems of social insurance and distribution of risk must be fair and inclusive.     

Market Effects of Voluntary Climate Action by Firms: Evidence from the Chicago Climate Exchange

Are private voluntary environmental actions by firms a sign of mismanagement, or a profitable “win-win” replacement for regulation? Empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. In this study, we use 19 years of monthly stock price returns, from 1991 to 2009, to examine the profitability of participation in CCX, a large voluntary greenhouse gas mitigation program. After controlling for systemic market risk as well as industry-specific shocks, we find statistically significant and positive excess returns for firms that announce their decision to join CCX. In addition, the progress of proposed greenhouse gas legislation (the Waxman–Markey bill) had a positive and large impact on excess returns for CCX member firms, suggesting that a major incentive for firms to join CCX may be to prepare for future regulation. Marginal abatement costs (proxied by the carbon price), on the other hand, were unrelated to excess returns. Our results imply that voluntary approaches should play a role in combating climate change, but that relying on them alone is not enough.