The tension that is often seen to exist between the ideals of liberalism and of democracy is examined in this paper in light of the distinction between two liberal outlooks at constitutional regimes, namely, on the one side, a liberal constitutionalism that focuses on the need to provide institutional safeguards of individual liberty as private autonomy and, on the other hand, a constitutional liberalism that focuses on the need to respect the freedom of individuals to choose the constitutional environment in which they wish to live. It is argued that a liberalism that consistently extends its fundamental ideal of individual sovereignty to the level of constitutional choice can be reconciled with the basic democratic ideal of citizen sovereignty. 相似文献
The present paper examines a neglected determinant of aggregate productivity: temporary cross-border flows of people. We hypothesize
that interaction between people from different nations facilitates the international diffusion of ideas, thus stimulating
aggregate productivity. In order to assess the causal impact of people flows on productivity, we construct an instrument for
people flows. By analogy to the trade/growth literature, this instrument is derived from a fitted gravity equation involving
geographic determinants of bilateral travel flows. Our cross-section analysis reveal that greater international interaction
leads to higher productivity; a very similar result, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, is obtained when we employ dynamic
panel data methods for the purpose of identification. 相似文献
I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary
punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants
in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively
correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high
contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions
of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching. 相似文献
We use topic modeling to study research articles in environmental and resource economics journals in the period 2000–2019. Topic modeling based on machine learning allows us to identify and track latent topics in the literature over time and across journals, and further to study the role of different journals in different topics and the changing emphasis on topics in different journals. The most prevalent topics in environmental and resource economics research in this period are growth and sustainable development and theory and methodology. Topics on climate change and energy economics have emerged with the strongest upward trends. When we look at our results across journals, we see that journals have different topical profiles and that many topics mainly appear in one or a few selected journals. Further investigation reveal latent semantic structures across research themes that only the insider would be aware.
We introduce two novel matching mechanisms, Reverse Top Trading Cycles (RTTC) and Reverse Deferred Acceptance (RDA), with the purpose of challenging the idea that the theoretical property of strategy-proofness induces high rates of truth-telling in economic experiments. RTTC and RDA are identical to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms, respectively, in all their theoretical properties except that their dominant-strategy equilibrium is to report one’s preferences in the order opposite to the way they were induced. With the focal truth-telling strategy being out of equilibrium, we are able to perform a clear measurement of how much of the truth-telling reported for strategy-proof mechanisms is compatible with rational behaviour and how much of it is caused by confused decision-makers following a default, focal strategy without understanding the structure of the game. In a school-allocation setting, we find that roughly half of the observed truth-telling under TTC and DA is the result of naïve (non-strategic) behaviour. Only 14–31% of the participants choose actions in RTTC and RDA that are compatible with rational behaviour. Furthermore, by looking at the responses of those seemingly rational participants in control tasks, it becomes clear that most lack a basic understanding of the incentives of the game. We argue that the use of a default option, confusion and other behavioural biases account for the vast majority of truthful play in both TTC and DA in laboratory experiments.
Indirect reciprocity is generally considered one of the leading mechanisms to explain how cooperation may emerge by natural selection. The basic intuition is that establishing a reputation of being a helpful individual increases the probability of being in turn helped. Two models have been proposed to describe how indirect reciprocity may work: the standing model (Sugden 1986/2004 in The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Blackwell, Oxford.) and the image-scoring model (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a in Nature 393:573–577, b in J Theoretical Biol 194:561–574). Although there is evidence that the former model would perform better under a wide set of circumstances, it is often maintained that it requires individuals with an implausibly large capacity of processing recursive information. In this paper, I argue that this is not actually the case. I further emphasize that even if the hypothesis of indirect reciprocity is unable to give a fair account of the ecological bases of cooperation, it has inspired a deal of research precious to social sciences. 相似文献
In The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (1986), Robert Sugden follows the tradition from Thomas Schelling and David Lewis in ascribing a central role to the notion
of salience within his theory of convention. However, against this, Bruno Verbeek (Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy,
Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002) has argued that an empirically adequate notion of salience may not be incorporated into a generic account of convention
without circularity obtains. This paper examines Verbeek’s argument against a background of experimental as well as theoretical
work on coordination problems. It finds that the argument fails to consider at least two candidate theories of salience that
may be incorporated into the theory of convention without circularity: cognitive hierarchy theory that iterates Sugden’s notion
of psychological salience and Schelling salience. Thus, in the end Verbeek’s criticism of the role ascribed to salience in
theories of convention may be dismissed, though its discussion draws a fruitful perspective. 相似文献
Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information
from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally
investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the
second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for
the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum
bargaining stage.
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