‘Regular’ choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference

We explore the relation between two ‘rationality conditions’ for stochastic choice behavior: regularity and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP). We show that WASRP implies regularity, but the converse is not true. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice function, which suffices for regularity to imply WASRP. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for regularity to imply WASRP. Furthermore, we identify necessary and sufficient domain restrictions for regularity to imply WASRP, when the universal set of alternatives is finite and stochastic choice functions are all degenerate. Results in the traditional, deterministic, framework regarding the relation between Chernoff’s condition and the weak axiom of revealed preference follow as special cases. Thus, general conditions are established, under which regularity can substitute for WASRP as the axiomatic foundation for a theory of choice behavior.     

The knowledge management strategy and the formation of innovative networks in emerging industries

This paper presents an agent-based simulation model with local network externality to analyze strategic interactions over investment on new economic knowledge. R&D knowledge flows and spillovers are the results of non-cooperative games played between neighboring agents in the model. The model demonstrates a situation where no agents have incentives to hide their economic knowledge, a situation that is observed in open source software development projects. The likelihood of obtaining a stable situation where new economic knowledge is openly shared is increased when heterogeneity of agents is introduced.      

A Test of Two Skew Models to Explain Cooperative Breeding

Synopsis Two competing models, reproductive skew and skew selection, have been constructed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated breeders. Reproductive skew is a trade-off model that assumes breeding occurs under scarce resource conditions. One breeder gains units of fecundity at the expense of other breeders during aggressive, altruistic or tug-of-war transactions. After joining, the distribution of fecundity among breeders shifts from symmetrical to asymmetrical. In contrast, skew selection is a surplus model that assumes breeding occurs during a springtime glut. Skew selection assumes that fecundity among breeders is initially asymmetrical and that joining reduces the asymmetry of fecundity. This paper reports findings from a breeding experiment on the fire ant, Solenopsis invicta, which supported skew selection rather than reproductive skew. Joining was a win-win strategy for alpha and beta breeders; beta breeders gained within-group survival benefits; alpha breeders gained between-group survival benefits. In summary, skew selection extends Darwin’s theory of natural selection by revealing the self-interested core of cooperative breeding.      

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

Environmental Product Differentiation and Environmental Awareness

In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers (green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it. Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the positive market effect.      

Feminist Ecological Economics and Sustainability

Synopsis New developments in feminist ecological economics and ecofeminist economics are contributing to the search for theories and policy approaches to move economies toward sustainability. This paper summarizes work by ecofeminists and feminist ecological economists which is relevant to the sustainability challenge and its implications for the discipline of economics. Both democracy and lower material throughputs are generally seen as basic principles of economic sustainability. Feminist theorists and feminist ecological economists offer many important insights into the conundrum of how to make a democratic and equity-enhancing transition to an economy based on less material throughput. These flow from feminist research on unpaid work and caring labor, provisioning, development, valuation, social reproduction, non-monetized exchange relationships, local economies, redistribution, citizenship, equity-enhancing political institutions, and labor time, as well as creative modeling approaches and activism-based theorizing.      

The Real Equilibrium South African Rand/US Dollar Exchange Rate: A Comparison of Alternative Measures

This article indicates how different measures of the real exchange rate, i.e., the exchange rate adapted for cost inflation, price inflation and labour costs, influence the equilibrium view and misalignment of the South African rand/US dollar exchange rate. The approach followed is based on the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate approach by Clark and MacDonald (1998), where the exchange rate is influenced by a number of fundamental and transitory factors. The real equilibrium exchange is estimated by using a single equation regression and a number of key explanatory variables. To determine the long-run relationship a Vector Error Correction Mechanism is used.     

Human Capital and Growth Cycles

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between human capital accumulation and economic growth. Capital market imperfections and an indivisibility in human capital investment prevent poor agents from accumulating skills, the acquisition of which positively affects technological progress. More productive technologies in turn require more sophisticated qualification and involve higher training costs. The equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by the joint evolution of productivity growth, the schooling costs, and the income distribution. Under our assumptions, individual incomes follow a non-linear Markov chain. This non-linearity generates endogenous fluctuations of schooling activities and the rate at which productivity improvements occur. We thank an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions. Support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) under grant KA1519/2-2 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.