全文获取类型
收费全文 | 74篇 |
免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 4篇 |
计划管理 | 10篇 |
经济学 | 31篇 |
综合类 | 1篇 |
贸易经济 | 20篇 |
农业经济 | 6篇 |
经济概况 | 3篇 |
出版年
2020年 | 2篇 |
2019年 | 2篇 |
2018年 | 2篇 |
2017年 | 2篇 |
2016年 | 1篇 |
2015年 | 1篇 |
2014年 | 2篇 |
2013年 | 7篇 |
2012年 | 2篇 |
2011年 | 6篇 |
2010年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 2篇 |
2007年 | 5篇 |
2006年 | 2篇 |
2005年 | 3篇 |
2004年 | 3篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 1篇 |
2001年 | 1篇 |
2000年 | 2篇 |
1999年 | 1篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 3篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 2篇 |
1989年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 2篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有75条查询结果,搜索用时 9 毫秒
71.
A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted. 相似文献
72.
Political processes may bring about Pareto improvements by increasing income inequality in a society that produces a public good by voluntary contributions. Proportional taxation funds a “governing agent.” The most endowed agent is the Condorcet winner for governing agent. When the tax rate can also be chosen by a vote, the ideal point of the agent with median initial endowment is the Condorcet winner under Cobb–Douglas utility. If Pareto improvements are possible, this ideal point corresponds to Pareto improvement. Pareto improvement may also be possible, even when a Leviathan set taxes, if there is deadweight loss from taxation. Pareto improvements are indeed always possible in “large” societies. On the other hand, no improvements may be possible if the initial distribution of wealth is very unequal in a “small” society, and Condorcet winners may not exist for other utility functions. 相似文献
73.
74.
75.
Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any insight regarding how we should argue in debates? We provide an answer in a model in which each discussant wants to convince the audience that a specific state holds. If the discussants' payoffs in the audience's posterior are concave above and convex below the prior and exhibit loss aversion, then the leading discussant should give precedence to the weaker argument, and the follower should respond to a weak argument weakly and to a strong argument strongly. Such characterizations are also obtained for the case of choosing between independent and correlated arguments. 相似文献