Differential and More Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries and the International Trading System

This article argues that "differential and more favourable treatment"of developing countries in the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade (GATT) has been a logical consequence of their owninward-looking policies and the GATT's implicit mercantilism,the latter implying that liberalization, being costly, shouldnot be demanded of relatively poor countries. Time has, however,reduced both the appeal of the protectionist model of developmentand the willingness of developed countries to accord differentialtreatment. The upshot has been pressure on more advanced developingcountries to "graduate" and a growing literature recommendingfuller and more equal participation of developing countriesin the GATT. The case for fuller and more equal participationis not self-evident. It needs to be assessed on its merits interms of the prospects for improved market access abroad andmore efficient policy at home. The analysis indicates that thepotential benefits should not be oversold. On balance, however,the most advanced developing countries would probably gain fromactive and more equal participation in both GATT and the multilateraltrade negotiations while the remaining developing countrieswould benefit from graduation by the more advanced.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

The specialist's discretion: stopped orders and price improvement

When a market order arrives, the NYSE specialist can offer aprice one tick better than the limit orders on the book andtrade for his own account. Alternatively, the specialist can'stop' the market order, which means he guarantees executionat the current quote but provides the possibility of price improvement.My model shows that specialists can use stops to sample thefuture order flow before making a commitment to trade. I presentempirical evidence that both stops and immediate price improvementimpose adverse selection costs on limit order traders.     

Does purchasing power parity hold in African less developed countries? Evidence from a panel data unit root test

This study tests for long-run relative purchasing power parityamong a sample of 27 African less developed countries. For thispurpose, a new test advocated by Im and co-workers is employedwhich allows one to test for unit roots in heterogeneous paneldatasets. This is known as the t-bar test, by which purchasingpower parity is confirmed or rejected on the basis of whetheror not the average augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic based ondemeaned data is significantly different from zero. Using quarterlydata covering the period 1974-97, purchasing power parity isgenerally rejected using individual country unit root testsbut support is found using the t-bar test. This suggests thatlow power problems in testing for purchasing power parity canbe overcome using this panel data procedure. The findings alsosupport the view that purchasing power parity is most likelyto be found among high inflation less developed countries andthat the half-life of a one-off random shock to parity is approximatelysix quarters. These results are generally confirmed for the1960-73 period.     

Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals

Differential economic behavior of for-profit and nonprofit institutionscan be manifest in both output and input markets. When behaviorin output markets is difficult to observe, behavior in inputmarkets can be useful proxies. We examine monetary compensationand its composition between base salary and bonus, and the associatedincentive structures, in the U.S. hospital industry. Our datapermit controlling for interinstitutional differences in thescope and complexity of jobs having the same titles, as wellas differences in organization size and other variables. Wefind (1) total monetary compensation for the two top executivejobs is substantially higher in the for-profit sector; and (2)the composition of compensation as between base salary and bonusdiffers materially across forms of organization, bonuses beingabsolutely and relatively greater in the for-profit sector.Particularly noteworthy is the finding that for-profit hospitalsutilize compensation mechanisms that, by involving larger contingentcomponents, provide stronger incentives - greater rewards -as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for performance that ismore easily monitored. While our findings are consistent withmore than one model of comparative organizations differ in theirgoals and, hence, in the kinds of managers they demand and thereward structures they offer. Nonprofit organizations may pursueobjectives that reflect greater concern about collective goodsor other outputs that are more difficult to measure and reward.Alternatively, nonprofits, confronted by a nondistribution constrainton the payout of profit to managers, may lack incentives forefficiency, and so may pursue other goals such as a quiet life.Such differential objective functions, together with the differentialconstraints on the distribution of profit to managers, havetwo kinds of implications. (1) Nonprofit and for-profit organizationsmay attract different kinds of managers, especially at the toplevels, because nonprofits prefer working for a nonprofit organizationand, hence, may offer a lower supply price to them. (2) Thetwo types of organizations can be expected to offer differentialcomposition of compensation as between base salary and performance-basedbonus, providing different incentives for managers. Our analysisis positive in character, the goal being to identify systematicdifferences in organization behavior.     

BRITISH EMPLOYEES: RESPONDING TO JAPANESE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHIES

Japan's industrial success has opened new opportunities in the area of business research and has generated particular interest in 'the Japanese way of doing things'. One specific area of concern has been that of job satisfaction and its relation to productive achievement. The study carried out in the United Kingdom involving one American, two ideally-matched Japanese subsidiaries and one British company, all involved in television manufacturing, refutes certain stereotypes about Japanese management. First, the study revealed that the two Japanese companies employed distinct personnel policies which were reflected in the differences in job satisfaction registered by their employees. Second, it showed that the paternalistic personnel policies instituted by one Japanese company were not preconditions for its high productive achievement but, selectively applied, generated appreciative feelings among its British work-force.