Systematic Political Grass–Root Support for Tariffs

The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.     

Debt-equity swaps and the heavily indebted countries

In search of solutions to the international debt crisis, attention has recently been focused on a new financing technique, so-called debt-equity swaps. An essential difference between these and the usual swapping of debt into equity is that the former allow a wider range of applications. The following article seeks to elucidate the possible contribution of debt-equity swaps towards easing the debt burden and to estimate the potential for a reduction in external debt and its effect on the balance of payments of the debtor nation.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

How to control a chaotic economy?

An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04.     

Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology

Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction.     

An axiomatic characterization of a generalized index of concentration

The Hannah-Kay [1977] generalized concentration index contains the well-known Herfindahl [1950]-Hirschman [1945] and the entropy indices as particular cases. In this papaer we show that the Hannah-Kay class can be regarded as a particular member of a generalized family of indices, which we refer to as self-weighted quasilinear means. We then show that among all self-weighted quasilinear means the Hannah-Kay family is the only class of concentration indices which satisfies the replication principle, a requirement which states that an m-fold replication of the industry, firm by firm, will multiply the concentration index by the factor 1/m.The refereeing process of this paper was handled through N.R. Adam.We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their suggestions.     

WIFO-JMX—An annual econometric macro model of the Austrian economy

Zusammenfassung Das Jahresmodell WIFO-JMX, das in der vorliegenden Arbeit vorgestellt wird, ist primär ein mittelfristiges Modell. Bei seiner Spezifikation wurde daher der Angebotsseite große Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Wir verwenden eineCobb-Douglas Produktionsfunktion als langfristige Planungsbeziehung. Von dieser Produktionsfunktion werden dann Faktor-nachfragegleichungen für Arbeit und Kapital abgeleitet. Die Identität der Produktionsfunktionsparameter in beiden Faktornachfragefunktionen garantiert die Konsistenz der langfristigen Eigenschaften dieser Beziehungen. Weiters erlaubt diese Spezifikation Faktorsubstitution als Reaktion auf änderungen in den relativen Preisen. In einem mittelfristigen Modell sollte dieser Aspekt nicht vernachlässigt werden. Die so geschätzten Faktornachfragefunktionen wurden dann ihrerseits verwendet, um verschiedene Auslastungsmaße herzuleiten. Wir unterscheiden hier zwischen Kapazitäts-, Vollbeschäftigungs- und Potentialproduktion.Es verwundert nun nicht weiter, daß ein mittelfristiges Modell kurzfristige Konjunkturschwankungen eher ungenau abbildet. Da aber gerade kurzfristige Prognoseprobleme im Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung breiten Raum einnehmen, haben wir eine spezielle Prognoseversion von WIFO-JMX entwickelt. Diese Version ist in ihrer theoretischen Struktur wesentlich einfacher. Wir ließen hier das Produktionsfunktionskonzept fallen, was den Simultanitätsgrad des Modells beträchtlich reduzierte. Erste Tests der Treffsicherheit der mit dieser Modellversion erstellten Prognosen verliefen zurfriedenstellend.Es soll jedoch nicht verschwiegen werden, daß beide Modellversionen noch recht unvollständig sing. Der monetäre und der öffentliche Sektor fehlen zur Zeit völlig, die Zahlungsbilanz wird gegenwärtig äußerst rudimentär behandelt. Wir beabsichtigen, dieses Basismodell nun nach und nach zu einem vollständigen Gleichungssystem der österreichischen Wirtschaft auszubauen. Dabei ist uns völlig bewußt, daß der vielleicht schwierigere Teil der Arbeit noch vor uns liegt. Denn für den monetären und den öffentlichen Sektor müssen wir Ansätze entwickeln, die den von ausländischen Erfahrungen hier teilweise stark abweichenden österreichischen Gegebenheiten Rechnung tragen.