Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.     

NONLINEAR AUTOREGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTED LAG APPROACH AND BILATERAL J‐CURVE: INDIA VERSUS HER TRADING PARTNERS

The J‐curve studies related to India have mostly either used aggregate trade flows of India with the rest of the world or between India and its trading partners. They have all assumed exchange rate changes have symmetric effects on Indian trade balance. In this article, we use partial sum concept combined with the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag approach of Shin et al. to show that indeed in some instances, there are evidences of asymmetry effects of currency depreciation. This new nonlinear approach provides more support for the J‐curve than the previous linear approaches. (JEL F31)     

Regulation and rent‐seeking: The role of the distribution of political and economic power

It is shown that the joint distribution of economic and political power plays a key role in determining regulatory and tax policies of national and subnational governments. If both economic and political power are evenly distributed across individuals, then regulatory and tax policies are efficient, but if they are unevenly distributed and positively correlated, then regulatory policy is used by subnational governments to redistribute income in favor of individuals with higher economic and political power at the expense of productivity and output. Consequently, the national government has to raise the tax rate to finance public expenditure. Moreover, if there exists a positive correlation between economic and political power, then the higher the fiscal gap, the larger the gap between equilibrium and efficient policies because subnational governments underestimate more the fall of public revenues caused by inefficient policies.     

Conflict technology in cooperation: The group size paradox revisited

This paper studies the implications of punishment‐induced conflict in a public goods game. It shows, under plausible assumptions, how larger group size sometimes enhances punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence supports higher levels of cooperation. Unlike existing approaches that focus on uncoordinated punishment, I consider punishment as a coordinated activity that may be resisted by those being punished and study the implications of punishment‐induced conflict situations. Developing a conflict model of punishment and combining it with a standard public good game, I show that coordinated punishment can yield the concentration effect of punishment, leading to a larger group advantage; that is, the larger the group, the easier it becomes to organize cooperation. The key idea is that when punishers coordinate their punishment, punishers as a coalition successfully divide defectors and punish each defector one by one. Surprisingly, even when coordination among punishers decays as group size increases, as long as the rate of decaying remains relatively slow the larger group advantage still obtains.     

A Strategic Implementation of the Shapley Value for the Nested Cost‐Sharing Problem

When agents have different needs for a public facility but serving a given agent allows serving all agents with smaller needs than his without any extra cost, how should the agents divide the cost of the facility among themselves? We provide a strategic implementation of the Shapley value for this class of cost‐sharing problems. We introduce a three‐stage extensive form game that respects individual rationality and show that there is one and only one subgame‐perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. Moreover, it is the allocation assigned by the Shapley value.     

Discounting and welfare evaluation of policies

We start with the premise that if policy discounting is to have any welfare relevance, one has to accept it being a derivative of a social welfare function (SWF). We show that if that derivative is to have a net present value (NPV) form, then the baseline allocation must be stationary. In addition, we show that at a stationary baseline in an overlapping generations growth economy, the intergenerationally fair discount rate equals the growth rate of per‐capita consumption, which is, roughly, 2% for the United States. This differs from the interest rate, even in the golden rule equilibrium, unless population growth is null. The last result is based on the main theorem in Mertens and Rubinchik (2012) and is demonstrated for a policy space that might naturally arise in applications.     

Monetary policy regime change and regional inflation dynamics: looking through the lens of sector‐level data for Korea

This paper explores the impact of the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) on the dynamics of city‐level inflation in Korea using both aggregate and sector‐level data. When looking at aggregate regional inflation, we find that the mean, volatility and persistence fell in all cities in the wake of the monetary policy regime change, consistent with other evidence in the literature. Delving more deeply into the disaggregate data reveals additional insights however. For most of the changes we observe in the dynamics of regional inflation, we find that the aggregate effects are being driven primarily by sectors that fall into the ‘Services’ category. We posit that the impact of better anchored inflationary expectations is primarily on the less‐traded services sectors of the economy, where the domestic monetary policy framework has a relatively larger influence. When it comes to the increased co‐movement observed across regions under an IT regime, however, it is the ‘Commodities’ sectors rather than ‘Services’ that are responsible, probably because services inflation becomes relatively more influenced by local factors once it has stabilized within the target range. Therefore, adoption of IT may not necessarily increase all measures of regional synchronization even when the goal of better‐anchored inflationary expectations is achieved.     

Is Private Saving in Latin America and the Caribbean Different?

Private saving and economic growth are intimately linked, and low saving rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have often been held responsible for disappointing growth in the region. Thus, identifying factors that spur saving is critical. This paper surveys previous empirical studies on LAC, highlighting contradictions, omissions and in some cases inconclusiveness of findings. Relying on a large dataset and a nested econometric framework, it analyzes private saving patterns and explores the role of its determinants in LAC, across LAC sub‐regions and compared with other regions. While the results highlight great heterogeneity in private saving rates within LAC and compared with the rest of the world, saving determinants are broadly the same notwithstanding some differences in sensitivity and contributions' sizes, and include its lag, income, demographics and public saving.     

Asymmetric Effects of Exchange Rate Changes and the J‐curve: New Evidence from 61 Malaysia–Thailand Industries

Research on the impact of currency depreciation on the trade balance is now moving in a new direction by incorporating nonlinear dynamic adjustment of the exchange rate and by using a nonlinear approach to error‐correction modeling and cointegration. Using these advances, researchers find not only more evidence of the J‐curve effect, but also new evidence of asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on the trade balance. We contribute to this line of research by using monthly trade flow data from 61 two‐digit industries that trade between Malaysia and Thailand, and show that not only does currency depreciation have favorable effects on the trade balance of more industries, but the long‐run effects are asymmetric in 26 out of 61 cases. In line with current literature, our nonlinear model performs much better than the linear model when industry level data are used.     

When a Door Closes,a Window Opens? Long‐Term Labor Market Effects of Involuntary Separations

This study estimates the earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. We employ, for the first time in the earning losses literature, a Poisson pseudo‐maximum‐likelihood estimator with fixed effects that has several advantages with respect to conventional fixed effects models. The Poisson estimator allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, including those with zero labor market earnings because of unemployment. By including individuals with zero earnings and by using our new method, the loss in the year of separation becomes larger than in previous studies. The loss starts with roughly 30% and, although it quickly shrinks, it remains at around 15% in the following years. In addition, we find that compared to other reasons for separation, the earning loss pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies such permanent scarring. This latter finding makes us confident that the self‐reported involuntariness of a separation is a reliable source of information.