Short term real earnings management prior to stock repurchases

This study examines whether firms engage in income-decreasing real earnings management before open market stock repurchases to reduce the cost of stock buybacks. In the short run, managers have the ability to underproduce inventory and increase discretionary expenditures, thus decreasing current period earnings. We find that managers engage in both of these activities before repurchasing their firms’ shares, especially the latter. Also, companies increase their discretionary spending before making repurchases to a greater extent following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as when they are financially healthy and have high marginal tax rates. Finally, we document that firms with the most income-decreasing real earnings management experience the largest positive abnormal returns during the subsequent period. Our findings highlight the importance of considering firms’ use of real operating decisions, as opposed to just opportunistic disclosure practices, around significant corporate events, such as the repurchase of their own stock.     

Stock price informativeness on the sensitivity of strategic M&A investment to Q

Using a strategic merger sample that covers the period from 1985 to 2011, we find that the acquirer’s stock price firm-specific information, the new information created by investors about the value of firm fundamentals, increases the positive sensitivity of strategic merger investment to the acquirer’s Q; the target’s stock price firm-specific information increases the negative sensitivity of merger investment to the target’s Q. These results suggest that managers learn from financial markets in identifying strategic merger investment opportunities by transferring assets from poorly managed firms to well managed firms. In addition, the target’s stock price firm-specific information itself increases the acquisition size, indicating that informed acquirer managers are more likely to take out large merger investment. Last but not the least, stock price informativeness increases merger synergies and post-merger performance, suggesting that informed managers make better merger investment that increases shareholder value. Our study contributes to the recent increasing stream of studies on managerial learning from the market.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

On the Earnings and Price Momentum Strategies: Evidence from European Real Estate Firms

We test the performance and interaction between earnings and price momentum for European real estate companies by first making use of decile portfolios sorted on the previous 3- to 12-month returns, standardized unexpected earnings and a combination of both. Then, the relation is tested on a risk-adjusted basis employing a 3-factor asset pricing model and Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression analyses. Our analyses reveal several critical findings: (1) both price and earnings momentum are effective for European firms, the effect being stronger for the UK than EU firms; (2) unlike U.S. REITs, price momentum seems to dominate drift for European firms; (3) there is weak evidence for positive interaction between drift and price momentum, contrary to the U.S. evidence; (4) the performance of momentum strategies depends on the state of the economy, while controlling for systematic factors; (5) idiosyncratic risk of real estate property firms may influence the returns on drift and momentum factors.     

Short-Sale Restrictions and Price Clustering: Evidence from SEC Rule 201

We provide a novel test of information-based theories of price clustering by examining trade, order, and the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quote price clustering during periods when information is removed from the market. We use a natural experiment of short-sale restrictions resulting from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 201 to more effectively determine the impact of information on price clustering. We find evidence of increased price clustering for trades, orders, and NBBO prices during short-sale restrictions. Overall, our findings indicate that short-sale restrictions harm the price discovery process and lead to a reduction in market efficiency.     

What Causes the Positive Price-Turnover Correlation in European Housing Markets?

This paper examines what determines the correlation between prices and turnover in European housing markets. Using a panel vector autoregressive model, we find that there is a particularly strong feedback mechanism between prices and turnover. Momentum effects are another important reason why prices and turnover are correlated. Common underlying factors, such as GDP and interest rates, also explain part of the price-turnover correlation. The results in this paper imply that, to understand price and turnover dynamics, it is important to model prices and turnover as two interdependent processes. There is a considerable bias in the coefficient estimates of standard house price models if this dependency is not explicitly taken into account.     

Dividend taxes and stock volatility

How do dividend taxes affect stock volatility? If a risk-averse executive faces price risk through his incentive contract, changes in stock volatility due to dividend taxes may increase agency costs and therefore decrease overall welfare. In this paper, I use a decrease in dividend taxes as a natural experiment to identify their effect on the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Stock volatility decreased after the tax cut for firms at which executives have larger sensitivity to stock price in their incentive compensation package relative to firms at which executives have a smaller sensitivity. Therefore, with risk-averse executives and risk-neutral shareholders, dividend taxes may exacerbate agency costs. The increase in agency costs will decrease shareholder welfare, which can be partially offset by the use of options in the employment contract.     

Tax penalties on fluctuating incomes: estimates from longitudinal data

Progressive personal income taxes can cause individuals with fluctuating incomes to pay more taxes over time than individuals with constant incomes of the same average value. The implicit tax penalty violates principles of equity and may harm efficiency by discouraging risk-taking activities, such as entrepreneurship. This paper uses longitudinal data to estimate the tax penalties in six panels of Canadian data from 1993 to 2010. The effects of various income averaging policies for mitigating tax penalties are then examined.     

Do specialized board committees impact the transparency of corporate political disclosure? Evidence from S&P 500 companies

This study examines how the specific attributes of one type of voluntary corporate governance mechanism, a specialized political contribution committee, improves the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). The results demonstrate that the existence of a committee that establishes and reviews key political activities and disclosure policies, particularly one composed entirely of outside directors, significantly enhances the transparency of corporate political disclosure, and reveal that an under-studied board committee, the political contribution committee, effectively improves CPD transparency. The results are consistent with agency theory and further support the more generalizable idea that specialized governance mechanisms (e.g., a political contribution committee) and fully independent committees lead to more transparent disclosure. Finally, the results suggest that the existence of a political contribution committee and committee independence are channels to improve CPD transparency. Public-policy makers and regulators seeking to enhance CPD transparency might consider implementing regulations that mandate or recommend these governance mechanisms as best practice.