The selection bias in court records: settlement and trial in eighteenth‐century Ottoman Kastamonu

Court records are used extensively in historical research. Preserved as summaries of daily legal proceedings, they give historians a unique opportunity to access information about the names, characteristics, and socio‐economic status of individuals and the laws, local customs, and legal institutions of societies. Although researchers have noted various limitations of these records, the problem of selection bias has not been systematically studied. Since litigants would probably settle disputes in which one side is likely to be a clear winner, the cases that go to trial are more likely to be the difficult and uncertain ones that comprise a non‐random subset of all disputes. This article presents a study of selection bias in Ottoman courts in the town of Kastamonu in northern Anatolia, from the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Disputes are categorized by type and the distribution of court participants is studied according to composition, gender, and socio‐religious status. A regression analysis is run to determine the factors affecting the likelihood of cases being tried in court. The results indicate that the cases that ended up in court were selected systematically. If the selection bias is ignored, research based on Ottoman court records may be seriously flawed in its ability to yield general conclusions.     

The economic role of foreclosures

We consider the economic consequences of changing the foreclosure rules. By incorporating renegotiation into the analysis, we show that although renegotiation decreases the number of foreclosures it can make the effects of foreclosure more significant. Even when foreclosure does not actually occur, a change in foreclosure rules changes the threat points of lender and borrower in any renegotiation, and thus changes the effective interest rate that the lender receives. In the long run, stated interest rates on loans will adjust to compensate for any change in the effective interest rate. We also examine the impact of a change in foreclosure laws on the borrower's welfare.