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201.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
202.
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
203.
We axiomatize a subjective version of the recursive expected utility model. This development extends the seminal results of Kreps and Porteus (Econometrica 46:185–200 (1978)) to a subjective framework and provides foundations that are easy to relate to axioms familiar from timeless models of decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis also clarifies what is needed in going from a represention that applies within a single filtration to an across filtration representation.Part of this research was conducted when Ozdenoren visited MEDS in Fall 2003. We thank Tapas Kundu, Costis Skiadas, Jean-Marc Tallon and Tan Wang for helpful discussions and also thank audiences at Koc University, Northwestern University, the CERMSEM conference “ Mathematical Models in Decision Theory” at Universite Paris I, and the FUR XI conference on foundations and applications of utility, risk and decision theory 相似文献
204.
205.
Conchita Garcés Ayerbe Carmen Galve Górriz 《International Advances in Economic Research》2003,9(2):123-132
This study presents theoretical arguments and evidence that attempt to show the contribution of economic mechanisms typical
of a business for resolving problems of environmental protection. Firstly, a brief synopsis is given of the classic solutions
that environmental economics proposes for correcting environmental externalities. Next, the benefit of expanding these two
mechanisms is discussed so that they include those intermediate mechanisms for which it is not possible to clearly establish
if they are developed within the domain of the market or the business. The study's focus resides in the fact that the explicit
expansion of the range of solutions proposed from a macroeconomic point of view establishes a connecting point between environmental
economics and business economics, an area in which academic attention to environmental matters has been significantly less.
The present work forms part of research project SEC2002-00835, financed by MCYT-FEDER. 相似文献
206.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
207.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
208.
Olga Shvetsova 《Constitutional Political Economy》2005,16(2):125-141
William Riker ((1964) Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown) stressed the problem of the contested nature of federal institutions and argued that federations existed
amidst the ongoing challenge to their rules, that federal institutions were being continuously endogenously produced in the
interaction of political parties rather than serving as self-enforceable constraints on the political process. As parties
changed, so did federalism, and eventually the balance was bound to shift to either one or the other extreme as far as the
degree of centralization was concerned. An alternative approach to essentially the same problem of federal instability was
to conceptualize the underlying game differently, as a game of coordination, so that institutions would be accepted as constraints
and would therefore be self-enforceable because they allow the players to avoid the chaos and successfully converge to an
outcome with payoffs exceeding their reservation values (Hardin, 1989, Ordeshook, 1992). The third proposed solution, consociationalism,
emphasizes the elite effort to overcome the conflictual nature of the institutional choice (Lijphart, 1977). Here, as in the
coordination argument, the hope is that one could create incentives for politicians to view the existing rules as advantageous
and to avoid redistribution by means of the institutional revision. Yet, just like the coordination argument, it is based
on an implicit assumption that politicians are more easily motivated to act “cooperatively” than are their constituencies.
The missing step in the literature is the mechanism by which this more or less “cooperative” behavior of elected politicians
could be sustainable in the environment of popular accountability. An essential component in building the theory of institutional
design is to show the possibility in a democracy of elected politicians cooperating on institutional matters even when each
of their constituencies would prefer to adjust the constitutional terms to its own advantage. Elite “cooperativeness” must
be sustainable even in the presence of outside challengers promising to stay closer to the constituent preferences. Here,
I present a model of mass-elite equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy, which demonstrates the possibility to motivate the
incumbents to sustain the institutional stability while at the same time protecting them from electoral defeat. I also discuss
the difficulties and limitations that such a solution faces, in particular, in plural societies.
JEL classification: H77, D02
In working on this paper, I have benefited from the discussions with Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, Charles Kromkowski,
Carol Mershon, and from the comments of the participants of the conference on ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional
Stability’’ at the MicroIncentives Research Center at Duke University, Durham, NC, April 30–May 1, 2004, and of the Lansing
Lee proseminar at the University of Virginia. The responsibility for the many remaining flaws is solely mine. 相似文献
209.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
210.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献