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Municipalities regulate sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) through the “secondary effects” doctrine, which justifies limiting First Amendment speech protections inside SOBs. Negative effects of SOBs on nearby neighborhood quality are a frequently cited secondary effect. Little empirical evidence exists that SOBs generate such negative externalities. If SOBs generate negative externalities, then nearby property prices should decrease when a strip club opens. We estimate regression models of housing prices to determine the effect of new clubs on nearby residential property prices in Seattle, exploiting the termination of a 17‐year moratorium on openings and find no evidence that strip clubs have “secondary effects.” 相似文献
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Countries with intermediate levels of institutional quality suffer larger output contractions following sudden stops of capital inflows than less developed nations. However, countries with strong institutions seldom experience significant falls in output after capital flow reversals. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors' ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy costs and the output loss following sudden stops. 相似文献
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We offer a novel investigation of the effect of environmental risk on cooperation in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Our baseline is the standard setting, in which the personal return from the public good is deterministic, homogeneous, and publicly known. Our experimental treatments alter this classic design by making the marginal per capita return from the public good probabilistic. In the homogeneous risk (HomR) treatment, the random draw is made for the whole group, whereas in the heterogeneous risk (HetR) treatment, this happens independently for each group member. Our hypothesis is that different environmental risks may differently affect the ex post payoff inequalities, so that other‐regarding preferences (inequality aversion) may generate higher contributions in HomR than in HetR. Our main result is that the environmental risk does not affect the patterns of cooperation either in the one‐shot or in the finitely repeated version of the game. This suggests that the standard experimental methodology provides a robust and conservative measure of human cooperation. 相似文献
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Adam Gifford 《Journal of Bioeconomics》2000,2(2):153-168
When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because
exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among
which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions
constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby
facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual
gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of
the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE).
The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group
when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in
biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary
in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior,
etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献