Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: Analysis, negotiations and results

Mexico faces both high deforestation and severe water scarcity. The Payment for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) Program was designed to complement other policy responses to the crisis at the interface of these problems. Through the PSAH, the Mexican federal government pays participating forest owners for the benefits of watershed protection and aquifer recharge in areas where commercial forestry is not currently competitive. Funding comes from fees charged to water users, from which nearly US$18 million are earmarked for payments of environmental services. Applicants are selected according to several criteria that include indicators of the value of water scarcity in the region. This paper describes the process of policy design of the PSAH, the main actors involved in the program, its operating rules, and provides a preliminary evaluation. One of the main findings is that many of the program's payments have been in areas with low deforestation risk. Selection criteria need to be modified to better target the areas where benefits to water users are highest and behavior modification has the least cost, otherwise the program main gains will be distributive, but without bringing a Pareto improvement in overall welfare.     

Shareholders' environmental profile and its impact on firm's environmental proactivity: An institutional approach

Theorists and practitioners still argue about different shareholders' environmental preferences. Drawing on various processes of institutional theory such as deinstitutionalization and defensive institutionalism, we test the differences between foreign and national shareholders' influences on firms' environmental proactivity. Specifically, we focus on the country of origin of the dominant shareholders and the environmental culture of the countries of origin of the shareholders. Using unbalanced panel data from between 2006 and 2017, which includes 12,527 observations of 1532 different firms from 11 economic sectors and across 23 countries, our results show that foreign shareholders are more prone to modifying existing environmental practices, whereas national shareholders may accept them, despite being reluctant to implement such changes. We make a contribution by showing that the deinstitutionalization forces coming from foreign shareholders are stronger than the defensive institutionalism efforts of national shareholders. However, such forces are not always the best options for sustainability.     

Distributive politics with other-regarding preferences

This paper analyzes a nonsmooth model of probabilistic voting with two parties and a broad family of other-regarding behavior, including fairness and quasi-maximin preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequity aversion. The paper provides conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness. It also characterizes the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when parties hold either symmetric payoffs, or minor forms of asymmetries. The characterization shows that the two parties converge to an equilibrium policy that maximizes a mixture of a “self-regarding utilitarian” social welfare function and an aggregate of society's other-regarding preferences. These results are shown to be applicable to other nonsmooth frameworks, such as probabilistic voting with loss averse voters. The characterization also shows that the direction and the size of the inefficiencies emerging from electoral competition depend in a subtle way on the nature of the other-regarding preferences (and resp., loss aversion).     

Supporting weakly Pareto optimal allocations in infinite dimensional nonconvex economies

In this paper, we prove a new version of the Second Welfare Theorem for economies with a finite number of agents and an infinite number of commodities, when the preference correspondences are not convex-valued and/or when the total production set is not convex. For this kind of nonconvex economies, a recent result, obtained by one of the authors, introduces conditions which, when applied to the convex case, give for Banach commodity spaces the well-known result of decentralization by continuous prices of Pareto-optimal allocations under an interiority condition. In this paper, in order to prove a different version of the Second Welfare Theorem, we reinforce the conditions on the commodity space, assumed here to be a Banach lattice, and introduce a nonconvex version of the properness assumptions on preferences and the total production set. Applied to the convex case, our result becomes the usual Second Welfare Theorem when properness assumptions replace the interiority condition. The proof uses a Hahn-Banach Theorem generalization by Borwein and Jofré (in Joper Res Appl Math 48:169–180, 1997) which allows to separate nonconvex sets in general Banach spacesThis work was partially supported by Nucleo Complex Engineering System. The successive versions of the paper were partly prepared during visits of Alejandro Jofré to CERMSEM and of Monique Florenzano and Pascal Gourdel to the Centro de Modelamiento Matematico. The hospitality of both institutions and the support of the french Coopération régionale Cone Sud are gratefully aknowledged. The authors thank Ali Khan for stimulating exchange of ideas and literature, Roko Aliprantis, Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Alain Chateauneuf, Roger Guesnerie, Filipe Martins Da Rocha, Moncef Meddeb, B. Mordukovich, Lionel Thibault and Rabee Tourky for valuable discussions     

Dollar-denominated accounts in Latin America during the 1990s

In this paper we analyze the evolution of dollar-denominated accounts in Latin America, and how they impact the stability of the banking system and the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates. Our findings reveal that dollar deposits are strongly influenced by depreciation expectations of the local currency even in an environment of fairly low inflation. We also find that having more dollar accounts increases the probability of future crises if the economy is already in a crisis. Finally, our findings suggest that for some macroeconomic aggregates there exists a positive correlation, in the long and short run, between their volatility and the volume of dollar-denominated accounts in the banking system. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Sociedad Hipoetcaria Federal de Mexico. The authors would like to thank Bruce Smith, Scott Freeman, Alex Minicozzi, Li Gan, Subal Kumbhakar, Gil Mehrez, Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, Keisuke Hirano, the participants of the University of Mississippi, Barcelona, and Texas at Austin seminar series and an anonymous referee for useful comments. The authors would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Bruce Smith.     

Negotiation Based on Fuzzy Logic and Knowledge Engineering: Some Case Studies

One of the most recent mathematical models for negotiation is the Compensatory Negotiation Solution by Knowledge Engineering (CNSKE). In this model a logic system called Compensatory Fuzzy Logic was used, which is more adequate to solve problems of decision making than the classical one probabilistic fuzzy logic system. The idempotency axiom of this system and the continuity of the operators allow the truth-values of the membership function to have a cardinal and not exclusively ordinal semantic meaning. On the other hand, continuity also makes ‘sensible’ the truth-values of the predicates. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the advantages of the CNSKE over other approaches in Game Theory. To show these advantages, some case studies are analyzed, consisting on the solution of three problems in which CNSKE is applied in economic and politic cases of negotiation, and compared with other alternative approaches.     

Leader Survival and Cabinet Change

Political leaders face both internal and external threats to their tenure as leaders. To retain office leaders need mass support, for instance to win elections. However, they also need to deal with potential internal party rivals. Using a game theoretic model, we examine how the incentives created by these competing pressures affect the retention of ministers across different political systems. Since non‐democratic leaders face relatively little threat from the masses, their concern is to reduce internal party risk. Therefore, they remove high performing ministers and retain mediocre and poor performers. As it becomes easier for the masses to replace the party in power, leaders must tradeoff internal and external threats. Retaining competent leaders improves party performance but generates an internal party rival.     

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.     

The Value of Territory: Towards a Marxist Geopolitics

The article argues for a Marxist geopolitics that moves beyond both critical geopolitics and the discredited classical geopolitics. It underlines the valorisation of territory by capital across three levels of abstraction: that of social infrastructure, class conflict and ground-rent proper. The recent Russian-Ukrainian gas wars are briefly analysed by way of illustrating the application of this distinctive approach to geopolitics.