Competition and Concentration in the New European Banking Landscape

This paper measures the degree of concentration and competition in the enlarged European Union (EU) banking environment over the period 1998–2002. In the empirical part we opt for a methodology as proposed by Panzar and Rosse based on a non‐structural estimation of market competition. Our results suggest that European banks were operating under conditions of monopolistic competition and that bank interest revenues in the 10 new EU member states was earned under conditions of higher competition than those that existed in the old EU banking countries. The opposite result was observed for total operating revenues. Smaller banks earn interest income in a less competitive environment than larger banks, while the opposite is observed for total revenues.     

Does a Nearby Murder Affect Housing Prices and Rents? The Case of Sydney

We measure the impact of murders on prices and rents of homes in Sydney. We find that housing prices fall by 3.9 per cent for homes within 0.2 miles of the murder in the year following the murder, and weaker results in the second year after a murder. We do not find any effects of murders on rents. Higher media coverage and being located closer to the murder (within 0.1 mile) have no additional effect on prices. Taken together, our findings suggest that proximity to a murder affects nearby property prices, particularly in the first year after the incident.     

A play-the-winner-type urn design with reduced variability

We propose a new adaptive allocation rule, the drop-the-loser, that randomizes subjects in the course of a trial comparing treatments with dichotomous outcomes. The rule tends to assign more patients to better treatments with the same limiting proportion as the randomized play-the-winner rule. The new design has significantly less variable allocation proportion than the randomized play-the-winner rule. Decrease in variability translates into a gain in statistical power. For some values of success probabilities the drop-the-loser rule has a double advantage over conventional equal allocation in that it has better power and assigns more subjects to the better treatment. Acknowledgments. I thank Stephen Durham, the associate editor, and the referees for their helpful suggestions.     

Learning and skills formation in the new economy: evidence from Greece

In today’s knowledge–driven economy, education and training are considered major factors affecting a society’s level of economic attainment and growth. Lack of information–related knowledge and skills, in particular, are among the prime factors likely to delay a country’s progress towards the information society. Experience, however, has shown that an educated labour force does not automatically translate into dynamic economic development and technological innovation. The human resource potential is not a simple outcome of the education system but it is a much more complex process that involves tacit knowledge, learning by doing and on–the–job training. This means that skills and knowledge acquired depend not only on the educational system but on firm organisation and culture as well as ties between organisations. The present study examines the relationship between skill supply, firm organisation and learning by means of interviews in 23 firms in Greece. It shows that a major problem faced by SMEs in peripheral European countries is the lack of in–house capabilities and knowledge which limits the amount and type of learning that takes place. Finally, the article argues that policy–makers should institute educational policies and training programmes that will compensate for the inability of Greek firms to provide a learning environment.     

Entrepreneurs' responses to semi-formal illegitimate institutional arrangements

While prior research has discussed how entrepreneurs deal with formal institutional voids and informal institutional environments, little is known about how entrepreneurs respond to institutional arrangements involving illegitimate actors. We define such arrangements as semi-formal illegitimate institutions. Using an exploratory study, we examine one such arrangement in Guatemala City, where organized crime dominates the institutional landscape in which entrepreneurs operate. We examine the strategic responses of these entrepreneurs, and find that they vary in the extent to which they resist semi-formal illegitimate institutions; some entrepreneurs engage in defiance, others avoid the illegitimate pressures, while others simply acquiesce. Upon further investigation, we find that the differences in entrepreneurs' network strength and network proximity, combined with their individual perception of threat and resource mobility, help to predict the different strategic responses.     

Strategic determinants for the selection of partner alliances in the Indian tour operator industry: A cross-national study

The purpose of this study is to investigate the strategic determinants for the selection of partner alliances in the Indian tour operator industry. Using data from 102 UK, USA, Canadian and French tour operators in India, the study revealed that there is a set of partner selection criteria that is of most importance. The study revealed that nationality of the international tour operator is the major characteristic that discriminates partner selection criteria. Alliance performance is positively associated, in a descending order, with tour package formulation efficiency, technological expertise, local operation expertise, and marketing system and status. Thus, the study indicates some clear messages to policy makers and practitioners.     

Evaluating an Environmental Right: Information Disclosure, Public Comment, and Government Decision Making in Ontario

In 1993, the Ontario government enacted the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR). The EBR guarantees residents of the province, among other things, the right to comment on permit requests to take water and to discharge into the air and a guarantee that these comments are taken into account in the decision to approve or deny a permit. We model the firm's decision to request a permit, a resident's decision to provide public comment, and the government's decision to approve or deny permit requests to use water or air. Our examination of 1,000 government decisions regarding permit requests leads to two key findings: (1) few permit requests receive any public comment; and (2) to the extent that the public does comment, we find no empirical evidence that comments affect the likelihood that the government will deny a permit request. Our theoretical model anticipates the first result: there are few comments observed for permit applications, because each individual has an incentive to undercontribute to the provision of a public good. The second result did not support the theoretical argument we advance: government, acting to maximize social welfare, takes public concern as a signal of environmental damage. En 1993, le gouvernement de l'Ontario a édicté la Charte des droits environnementaux (CDE). La CDE garantit aux résidents de la province, entre autres, le droit de faire des observations sur les demandes de permis pour puiser l'eau et rejeter des quantités limitées de substances polluantes dans l'air, et garantit aussi que ces observations seront prises en considération dans la décision d'accorder ou de refuser un permis. Nous avons modélisé la décision d'une entreprise de déposer une demande de permis, la décision d'un résident de faire des observations et la décision du gouvernement d'accorder ou de refuser les demandes de permis pour l'usage de l'eau ou de l'air. L'examen de 1000 décisions du gouvernement concernant des demandes de permis a menéà deux principaux constats: 1. peu de demandes de permis reçoivent des observations du public; 2. lorsque le public soumet des observations, aucune évidence empirique ne laisse supposer que les observations influent sur la probabilité que le gouvernement rejette une demande de permis. Notre modèle théorique a anticipé le premier constat: les demandes de permis reçoivent peu d'observations parce que chaque individu a un incitatif à sous–contribuer à la fourniture d'un bien collectif. Le deuxième constat n'a pas appuyé notre argument théorique voulant que le gouvernement, qui agit afin de maximiser le bien–être collectif, tienne compte des préoccupations du public comme un signal de dommage environnemental.     

Profit efficiency in the European Union banking industry: a directional technology distance function approach

We employ the directional technology distance function approach and present estimates of profit efficiency in the 25 European Union (EU) member states over the period 1998–2008. This method decomposes profit efficiency into its technical and allocative components. We investigate potential efficiency differences across the old EU region and the new EU member states, across countries and across banks of different size. Our results indicate a significant level of profit inefficiency for the EU region, which is predominantly attributed to allocative inefficiency. Our findings also suggest that banks operating in the old EU region are, on average, more profit efficient than credit institutions in the new EU member states. Overall, we observe considerable variation of efficiency scores across countries and different patterns in efficiency change over time, as well as a negative relationship between bank size and efficiency.     

Jumping over a low hurdle: personal pension fund performance

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the annual and of the long-term performance of personal pension funds relative to their Primary Prospectus Benchmarks (PPBs) and T-bills. The study covers 9659 personal pension funds from across all 30 ABI investment sectors that operated in the UK in the 1980–2009 period. Of these, 4531 pension funds are compared against their PPBs. The performance measured by ordinary excess returns over the UK T-bills and over PPBs, as well as the Sharpe ratio, Sharpe ratio adjusted for skewness and kurtosis, Sortino ratio in relation to the UK T-bills and PPBs, and the Modigliani–Modigliani measure are calculated for arithmetic, geometric and log returns. We find convincing evidence that pension funds lack challenging long-term performance targets. We argue that the existing PPBs are easy to outperform given that funds are allowed to diversify in assets not included in their PPBs. We discuss policy implications of our findings.