Technical change and irreversible investment under risk

A stochastic dynamic model was constructed to analyze investment decisions of an individual farme under risk in the presence of legibilities, embedded technical change and indivisible capital. An analytical solution was obtained and its local behavior studied by numerical methods. Optimal investment is obtained by regulating the difference between the desired and actual capital stocks between two barriers that define an inaction interval. While the desired capital drifts between the barriers, no action is taken. If the desired capital touches the upper barrier, the farmer invests pushing the average efficiency of the actual capital stock up. This in turn raises the desired capital even higher and contracts the inaction interval. If these effects are strong enough, the farmer will invest again until the potential gains of the technological package are exhausted. If the desired capital falls enough, the farmer disinvests, pushing down the average productivity and expanding the inaction interval. Disinvestment continues until it slops either because the inaction interval becomes so wide that it is no longer optimal to disinvest or because the actual capital stock is so small that it is no longer profitable to produce.     

Consumer Welfare and the Loss Induced by Withholding Information: The Case of BSE in Italy

The paper develops a measure of consumer welfare losses associated with withholding information about a possible link between BSE and vCJD. The Cost of Ignorance (COI) is measured by comparing the utility of the informed choice with the utility of the uninformed choice, under conditions of improved information. Unlike previous work that is largely based on a single equation demand model, the measure is obtained retrieving a cost function from a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System. The estimated perceived loss for Italian consumers due to delayed information ranges from 12 percent to 54 percent of total meat expenditure, depending on the month assumed to embody correct beliefs about the safety level of beef.     

The general dynamic factor model: One-sided representation results

Recent dynamic factor models have been almost exclusively developed under the assumption that the common components span a finite-dimensional vector space. However, this finite-dimension assumption rules out very simple factor-loading patterns and is therefore severely restrictive. The general case has been studied, using a frequency domain approach, in Forni et al. (2000). That paper produces an estimator of the common components that is consistent but is based on filters that are two-sided and therefore unsuitable for prediction. The present paper, assuming a rational spectral density for the common components, obtains a one-sided estimator without the finite-dimension assumption.     

Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?

Occupational licensing regulations require workers in many different professions to obtain a special permit to work legally in their chosen field. Although professional associations argue that the only goal of professional licensing is to protect the public, occupational regulation may also reduce competition: for example, by reducing entry. This paper reviews the recent literature and policy developments on the subject, with a focus on the European Union.

     

Income taxation when markets are incomplete

We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxation in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI). Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truthfully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving. These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk-sharing opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy transmission mechanism considered does not rely on second-order, relative spot price effects. Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substantially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as, for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), or in Citanna et al. (2001). Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 58E17, 46N10, 93B29 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D52, H21, H24, H25     

Metatheory as the key to understanding: Schumpeter after Shionoya

In his recent book, Yuichi Shionoya departs from previous Schumpeterianstudies. He sets out to reconstruct Schumpeter's metatheoreticalframework, which he argues is the key to a correct interpretationof his substantive writings. The centrepiece of this projectis the thesis that Schumpeter has a coherent methodologicalposition—instrumentalism—which consistently underpinshis theoretical work. The present paper examines this thesis,and in so doing paves the way for an alternative hypothesison Schumpeter. This hypothesis is based on Tony Lawson's workon the philosophy of economics.     

Do financial variables help predict the state of the business cycle in small open economies? Evidence from Switzerland

We analyze the forecasting ability of financial variables to predict the state of the Swiss business cycle up to eight quarters ahead. Overall, our results suggest that financial variables convey leading information for the prediction of business cycles, even when applied to a small open economy. However, we clearly find that model specifications need to be extended to include variables accounting for external shocks, such as exchange rates or international commodity prices. It also appears that the forecasting contribution of individual variables changes over time. Specifically, in the last two decades, stock market liquidity has replaced the term spread as the best single predictor.     

The influence of the institutional context on corporate illegality

This paper examines the relationship between the institutional environment and sustained corporate illegality. We find that cognitive assumptions generate expectations that can, under specific circumstances, induce organizations to amplify illegal actions and that serve to lessen regulatory scrutiny. We also find that, once initiated, illegal actions can become hidden because of institutionalized practices that enable their concealment and that weaken the prospect of detection. These processes and effects are particularly noticeable in networks of professional regulators who become mutually over-confident and over-influenced by each other to the extent that their independent critical assessments and judgements are compromised. Mechanisms of mimetic herding and social humiliation compromise independence of judgement. Networks of interacting professionals are thus vulnerable to a collectively induced lowering of regulatory vigilance.