Remarks on good vs. bad characteristics in vertical differentiation

In a recent paper, Garella and Lambertini [Economic Letters 65 (1999) 245] claim that we should distinguish between good and bad characteristics in analysing the incentives for a duopoly to vertically differentiate their products. We prove here that the results obtained by the authors are false and we show that in the context of their model, maximum differentiation should appear whether characteristic is good or bad.     

What motivates professional service firm employees to nurture client dialogues?

Dialogues between professionals and their clients are at the core of relationship marketing of professional service firms. To nurture dialogues, professionals need to extend the scope of the dialogue to new issues that impact the client organization's performance. We develop and examine (N?=?431) a model grounded in the theory of planned behavior to highlight factors that impact the willingness of professionals to initiate the extension of client dialogues. Three main results are found. First, affective and instrumental attitudes are distinct and different motivational antecedents that simultaneously impact willingness. Second, affective and instrumental attitude are intermediate psychological considerations shaped by extrinsic rewards, reciprocal relationships, and client relationship quality. Third, organizational pressure operates indirectly by instilling a personal professional norm to extend client dialogues.     

Long-run Study of Residential Water Consumption

The estimation of dynamic models and themeasure of long-run effects arerare in residential water demand studies. Weshow in this paper that a dynamicmodel of water consumption can be derived froma structural optimisation programsolved by local communities. Thisnonlinear model is estimated on asample of French municipalities and is foundasymptotically equivalent to a dynamic panel data model that is linear in theparameters. The latter includes anoriginal error-component structure that allowsfor a flexible heterogeneity pattern, including both the usual idiosyncraticeffect, and an additional individualeffect affected by a multiplicative time-varyingparameter. As usual GMM estimators for panel data are not consistent inthis case, we propose a new GMMprocedure that yields consistent and efficientestimates of short- and long-runprice elasticities (respectively −0.26 and−0.40).     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.