The use of Probability-Multipliers in Replacement Analysis

Engineering economy analyses are often made for both the most and least favorable combinations of forecasted future conditions. This procedure has two major weaknesses. First, the two solutions usually indicate that contradictory courses of action should be followed. When this occurs, the engineeringeconomic study has failed to provide the management of a business with a quantitative aid and mathematical method for evaluating data and arriving at sound decisions. Second, that method of analysis is unrealistic because it emphasizes the extreme possibilities rather than some intermediate situation which is more likely to occur.     

Interpreting Nicknames: A Micropolitical Portal

Perhaps due to their ubiquitous and seemingly nonsensical nature, workplace nicknames have received little analytic attention to date. This exploratory study based on six case scenarios from the United States reveals nicknames often convey potent meanings. These monikers are found to have a wide variety of purposes: including among others, furthering social control, contributing to socialization, marking group boundaries, building camaraderie, catalysing joking, conveying discontent, cathartically venting frustrations, equalizing social exchanges and adjusting to labelling. Although the nicknaming and collateral social processes we encountered were not the product of formal planning, they are a complex and highly organized set of micropolitical activities. In the future, nicknames should be thought of as key symbols that can unlock many meanings when they are properly interpreted     

Can retailers get higher prices for “end-of-life” inventory through online auctions?

Manufacturers and retailers are using online auctions to liquidate excess inventory. Using a field study of 11,879 online auctions, this paper builds upon theories of competitive processes to relate four key seller-controlled variables (starting price, day of close, auction length, and brand) to outcomes of online auction for apparel goods. Results suggest that to obtain a higher percentage of the original retail price, retailers should start with a lower price and feature national brands. These and other findings are discussed and a number of future research topics are offered.     

LAND MARKETS AND THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON FORMAL-SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN URBAN INDONESIA

Until recently, urban land and housing markets in Indonesia seemed to function well. Informal-sector development provided low-income housing affordably. Through government programs, formal-sector developers could build housing for all but the poor. Since 1989, however, daily conversation pictures land speculation as rampant and formal-sector housing as rising beyond the means of the middle class. Newspapers carry stories of conflicts between small landowners and large developers with government officials in between. This article investigates this situation by addressing two related questions: are urban land prices rising “too fast?”; how do land regulations and development practices affect costs, and who pays these costs? The article includes quantitative estimates of urban land prices, changes in urban land supply, movement of land through the permitting process, and the effect of development regulations on costs. Data come from a literature survey and interviews of some of the largest formal-sector developers in Indonesia. A principal finding concerns a development regulation called a “location permit” and the “social function” of land in Indonesian law. Although helpful as a means of assembling land in Indonesia's highly fragmented land markets, location permits allow formal-sector developers to hold land off the market and pay low prices to small landowners. Ultimately, the “social function” of land under Indonesian law holds down the price formal-sector developers pay for land, but not at the price at which they sell their product. The article concludes by proposing reforms to the regulatory process.     

Estimating Quality‐adjusted Price Changes: Method and Application to VCRs

This paper uses scanner data to generate estimates of quality‐adjusted price changes for video‐recorders. We use hedonic regressions to derive estimates of the changing worth of each quality component. These are then applied to weighted changes in the mix of quality attributes of products to derive estimates of quality‐adjusted price (QAP) changes. The data source used is electronic‐point‐of‐sale (EPOS) scanner data that are available for a wide range of goods. This study provides an example of how such methods can be more widely applied. The estimates of QAP changes correspond to constant‐utility, (hedonic) cost‐of‐living indexes defined in economic theory as the ratio of expenditure functions at constant utility allowing for changing prices and characteristics of goods. This method is proposed as an improvement on the existing direct method , which takes its estimates directly from the coefficients associated with 'time dummies' in a hedonic regression. We finally undertake a matching process, akin to that used by statistical offices, and compare the results. Direct comparisons with RPI estimates and these hedonic approaches are not easy since the approaches use quite different data sets. Our replication of a procedure akin to that used for the RPI on the scanner data set provides insights into sources of potential bias.     

On the Function Coefficient, Euler's Theorem, and Homogeneity in Production Theory

This paper makes three related points useful in teaching first-year graduate production theory. First, the local applicability of the classical function coefficient idea for short-run nonhomogeneous production technologies is shown for returns to scale, satisfaction of second-order and total conditions for profit maximization, and delineation of the economic region of production in factor space. Second, the general applicability of Euler's Theorem results to nonhomogeneous (variable-proportional-return) cases is developed. Lastly, it is shown that short-run, nonhomogeneous production/yield functions are fully consistent with long-run linear homogeneity.     

Paradigms in Industrial Relations: Original,Modern and Versions In‐between

This article argues that the industrial relations (IR) field has had two distinct paradigms — an original paradigm centred on the employment relationship, and a modern paradigm centred on unions and labour–management relations. In practice, IR scholars in the decades after the Second World War frequently adopted the former as a broad principle but followed the latter in research and teaching. The narrower labour–management paradigm has created a significant survival challenge for the IR field, given the marked long‐term decline in union density in most countries. I join with others in arguing that to survive and prosper in the years ahead, the field needs to return to an updated version of the original ‘employment relationship’ paradigm. To promote this end, I describe the major features of the original paradigm, including its core positive and normative principle. I also outline how this core principle provides the foundation for an integrative IR theory of the employment relationship, which the field greatly needs to move ahead.     

UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency — A Research Note

High levels of executive pay in the USA and the UK have attracted journalistic and academic criticism to the effect that they constitute rent extraction by self‐interested executives rather than rewards for raising shareholder returns. The focus of most criticism has been on salary, severance payments and various long‐term incentives (particularly share options). However, executive bonuses have attracted little attention and have been only lightly regulated. This raises important questions. Has lighter regulation been associated with significant levels of rent extraction through bonuses, that is, a weak relation between bonus pay and shareholder returns? Have more transparent performance conditions attached to bonuses strengthened the relation, making rent extraction more difficult, or have they acted as camouflage for rent extraction, associated with higher bonus pay but lower pay‐performance responsiveness? Are measures of CEO power associated with larger bonuses? This empirical note provides the first, preliminary answers to these questions.