A Property Rights Paradox: George and Rothbard on the Conservation of Environmental Resources

A bstract . Murray N. Rothbard is recognized as one of the most articulate modern critics of Henry George's land value tax. A leading libertarian thinker, Rothbard condemns George's recommendation that government act to affect private transactions in land, arguing that such interventions infringe on previously defined private property rights. However, Rothbard's social system has no explicit mechanism for accommodating the emergence of tradeable property rights to newly recognized environmental resources. In effect, Rothbard calls for controls on such resources—no trading. Henry George, on the other hand, provides for the evolution of new property rights and their emergence into private markets. The paradox here is that George's solution to the property rights question might accommodate the social yearnings of one of his most severe critics, Murray N. Rothbard.     

The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set

In this paper, we consider a continuum economy with a finite number of types of agent, and several private and public goods. The main result of the paper is that the graph of the equal-treatment Lindahl equilibria mapping is the unique abstract stable set with respect to the dominance relation in economies with crowding effects introduced by Vasil'ev et al. in 1995. The external stability of this mapping implies that, for any equal-treatment allocation x in , that is not a Lindahl equilibrium, there exists a subeconomy of such that one of its equal-treatment Lindahl allocations blocks x. This result is a counterpart of the theorem of Mas-Colell for Aumann's atomless market with private goods.     

Book Reviews

Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986 pp. xxv + 425. Indexed. $19.95.

W.L. Korthals Altes, Changing Economy in Indonesia: Volume 7: Balance of Payments, 1822–1939, Amsterdam: The Royal Tropical Institute. pp. 167.

Trade Statistics, Java, 1823–73: Trade Statistics, Indonesia 1874–1937. Mededeelingen van het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek nos 160 and 161

Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985 pp. xii + 291, map, tables. graphs, glossary, index. Cloth $38.50.

Sediono M.P. Tjondronegoro, Social Organization and Planned Development in Rural Java, Singapore, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, pp. xv + 326.

A. Fujimoto and F. Matsuda (eds), An Economic Study of Rice Farming in West Java, Tokyo: NODAI Research Institute, Tokyo, University of Agriculture, 1986.

A. Fujimoto and T. Matsuda (eds), A Comparative Study of the Structure of Rice Productivity and Rural Society in Southeast Asta Two Village Studies in Indonesta and Thailand, Tokyo: University of Agriculture, 1985. Reviewed by C.L J. van der Meer (1986) Bulletin of Indanesian Economic Studies, 22(2) pp. 124–27

David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975–1983, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series No. 64, 1984, pp. xiii + 280. US$12.50. David Bourchier, Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia Sawito and the Phantom Coup, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, 1984, pp. 128. US$9.00.

Linda G. Martin (ed), The ASEAN Success Story: Social, Economic, and Political Dimensions, East-West Center, distributed by the University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987, pp. xviii + 253. $15.00.

Mubyarto and Edy Suandy Hamid (eds), Kredit Pedesaan di Indonesia, Badan Penerbit Fakultas Ekonomi, U.G.M., 1986 pp, 160.

Ron Hatley, et al., Other Javas Away from the Kraton, Melbourne: Monash University, 1984, pp. 60.

K.S. Nathan and M. Pathmanathan (eds), Trilateralism in Asia: Problems and Prospects in US-Japan-ASEAN Relations, Antara Book Company, Kuala Lumpur, 1986, pp. xviii + 205. $18.00 (cloth): $12.00 (paper).     

The identification of South African technological innovations: A proposed methodology

Technological innovations represent significant indicators of scientific and economic vigour in any society. They are however, extremely difficult to both identify, and to evaluate in terms of their importance.

This paper addresses itself to the problems of identification and measurement. As such it forms a necessary prerequisite to a survey of technological innovations in South Africa, and, in the process, seeks to contribute to the general field of technological enquiry.     

Economic Potential of Biomass Based Fuels for Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation

Use of biofuels diminishes fossil fuelcombustion thereby also reducing net greenhousegas emissions. However, subsidies are neededto make agricultural biofuel productioneconomically feasible. To explore the economicpotential of biofuels in a greenhouse gasmitigation market, we incorporate data onproduction and biofuel processing for thedesignated energy crops switchgrass, hybridpoplar, and willow in an U.S. AgriculturalSector Model along with data on traditionalcrop-livestock production and processing, andafforestation of cropland. Net emissioncoefficients on all included agriculturalpractices are estimated through crop growthsimulation models or taken from the literature. Potential emission mitigation policies ormarkets are simulated via hypothetical carbonprices. At each carbon price level, theAgricultural Sector Model computes the newmarket equilibrium, revealing agriculturalcommodity prices, regionally specificproduction, input use, and welfare levels,environmental impacts, and adoption ofalternative management practices such asbiofuel production. Results indicate no rolefor biofuels below carbon prices of $40 perton of carbon equivalent. At these incentivelevels, emission reductions via reduced soiltillage and afforestation are more costefficient. For carbon prices above $70,biofuels dominate all other agriculturalmitigation strategies.     

On the theory of cost sharing

This paper investigates efficiency and equitability issues given a cost sharing method in an economy with a public commodity. We study the concept of a -cost share equilibrium and examine the set of all equilibrium allocations. Finally, we devise a mechanism to implement -cost share equilibria as strong equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game.This paper was written while Shlomo Weber was visiting the University of Bonn. Financial support from theSonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. We also would like to thank Dieter Bös for valuable comments.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001