BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.     

Consumption,Credit, and the Missing Young

There are more young adults today with either no credit history or insufficient credit history to be scored by one of the major credit bureaus than there were before the Great Recession—a reality that is likely an outcome of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009–10. In regressions that include a rich set of controls, we show that measures of young adults missing a credit score in credit bureau data act as a drag on state-level consumption growth. We demonstrate that this effect is driven by young people's loss of access to credit since the legislation went into effect.