Optimal payoffs under state-dependent preferences

Most decision theories, including expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory, assume that investors are only interested in the distribution of returns and not in the states of the economy in which income is received. Optimal payoffs have their lowest outcomes when the economy is in a downturn, and this feature is often at odds with the needs of many investors. We introduce a framework for portfolio selection within which state-dependent preferences can be accommodated. Specifically, we assume that investors care about the distribution of final wealth and its interaction with some benchmark. In this context, we are able to characterize optimal payoffs in explicit form. Furthermore, we extend the classical expected utility optimization problem of Merton to the state-dependent situation. Some applications in security design are discussed in detail and we also solve some stochastic extensions of the target probability optimization problem.     

Married womens' tastes and the decision to participate in the labour market: results from a fixed effects model

In the paper, we report estimates from two logit models of Women's labour force participation. A model with out fixed effects, estimated from cross-sectional data-indicates a significant postive relation between work experience and particiption. We ask whether the relation is due to a causal influence extered by the former variable on the latter or to a common underlying variable: taste for market attachement. To answer this question. we present results from a fixed effects model estimated from panel data. In this model, the estimated coefficients of experience are insignificant, suggestion that a taste for market attachement underlies both experience and participation is the presence of preschool children.     

Investment in public infrastructure with spillovers and tax competition between contiguous regions

Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastructure levels in a first stage and compete in taxes in a second stage. We study the properties of Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria in this stage game depending on the extent to which the benefits of infrastructure spill over from one region to the other. First, we show that the presence of inter-regional spillovers allows jurisdictions to control for the intensity of tax competition and therefore affects the optimal levels of infrastructure selected at equilibrium. Second, by comparing the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes, we show that the extent to which regions overinvest in infrastructures negatively depends on the intensity of the spillovers.     

Pricing accuracy,liquidity and trader behavior with closing price manipulation

We study the effects of closing price manipulation in an experimental market to evaluate the social harm caused by manipulation. We find that manipulators, given incentives similar to many actual manipulation cases, decrease price accuracy and liquidity. The mere possibility of manipulation alters market participants’ behavior, leading to reduced liquidity. We find evidence that ordinary traders attempt to profitably counteract manipulation. This study provides examples of the strategies employed by manipulators, illustrates how these strategies change in the presence of detection penalties and assesses the ability of market participants to identify manipulation.     

The Institutionalization of Fair Trade: More than Just a Degraded Form of Social Action

The context of economic globalization has contributed to the emergence of a new form of social action which has spread into the economic sphere in the form of the new social economic movements. The emblematic figure of this new generation of social movements is fair trade, which influences the economy towards political or social ends. Having emerged from multiple alternative trade practices, fair trade has gradually become institutionalized since the professionalization of World Shops, the arrival of fair trade products in the food industry, and the establishment of an official “fair trade” label. With the strength that this institutionalization has generated, fair trade can now be considered a real trade system that questions, as much as it renews, the traditional economic system. In parallel, this transformation has exacerbated the tensions within the movement, which can be characterized as a clash between a “radical, militant” pole and a “softer, more commercial” one. However, it is not the actual institutionalization of fair trade which is being debated among fair trade actors on either side of the fence, but rather the challenges inherent in finding an economic institutionalization acceptable to social economic movements. Therefore the institutionalization process of fair trade should not be seen as mere degradation of social action, but rather as typical of the institutionalization process of new social economic movements. If we need to worry about the highjacking and alteration of the fair trade movement by the dominant economic system, the opposite is no less likely, as new social economic movements contribute to an ethical restructuring of markets.     

The impact of limit order anonymity on liquidity: Evidence from Paris, Tokyo and Korea

This paper examines the impact of broker anonymity on bid-ask spreads in order driven markets. Previous theoretical research predicts that limit order anonymity results in deeper and more liquid markets. This paper examines this proposition using three natural experiments provided by Euronext Paris, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Korea Stock Exchange. Euronext Paris and the Tokyo Stock Exchange removed broker identifiers from limit orders on April 23, 2001 and June 30, 2003, respectively. In contrast, the Korea Stock Exchange introduced broker identifiers for limit order books on October 25, 1999. The results provide evidence that altering limit order anonymity has an impact on liquidity. Consistent with expectations, liquidity is enhanced by increased anonymity and adversely affected by decreased anonymity.     

How broker ability affects institutional trading costs

The present paper shows that broker research and trade execution ability has a significant impact on the cost of institutional trading. The results reveal that there is significant variation in the ability of brokers to control execution costs. Trades executed by brokers with stronger research ability exhibit a higher permanent price impact, whereas those executed by brokers with better execution ability exhibit a lower temporary price impact. Brokers are also found to specialize on an industry level that gives rise to variation in ability within a brokerage house.     

An optimal insurance design problem under Knightian uncertainty

This paper solves an optimal insurance design problem in which both the insurer and the insured are subject to Knightian uncertainty about the loss distribution. The Knightian uncertainty is modeled in a multi-prior g-expectation framework. We obtain an endogenous characterization of the optimal indemnity that extends classical theorems of Arrow (Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Markham, Chicago 1971) and Raviv (Am Econ Rev 69(1):84–96, 1979) in the classical situation. In the presence of Knightian uncertainty, it is shown that the optimal insurance contract is not only contingent on the realized loss but also on another source of uncertainty coming from the ambiguity.