What's in Your 403(b)? Academic Retirement Plans and the Costs of Underdiversification

Sponsors of defined contribution retirement plans typically limit the investment choices of plan participants to a small number of investment managers and a limited number of investment vehicles. Such restrictions may limit excessive risk-taking by participants but also may preclude opportunities for efficient diversification. Many college and university 403 (b) plans have restricted investment choices to the retirement annuities offered by TIAA-CREF, the current manager of over half of all 403(b) contributions. Using 10 years of historical data, we study the efficiency of this TIAA-CREF opportunity set relative to a larger set that includes several standard index funds. Extrapolations must be interpreted -with caution. Assuming optimal rebalancing, depending on loss aversion and diversification constraints, the historical sample of returns implies that over a 20-year remaining work life, an employee -with an expanded menu that includes standard index funds could gain over 40% in terminal wealth compared to one who is restricted to TIAA-CREF retirement annuities. Even when a naive diversification strategy of equally weighting (1/n) all available funds is used, the expandedmenu outperforms the restricted portfolio by more than 25% over20years. These differences generally are significant at conventional levels based on parametric and nonparametric testing and do not appear to result from idiosyncratic market performance durinz the sample period.     

How disclosure quality affects the level of information asymmetry

We examine two potential mechanisms through which disclosure quality is expected to reduce information asymmetry: (1) altering the trading incentives of informed and uninformed investors so that there is relatively less trading by privately informed investors, and (2) reducing the likelihood that investors discover and trade on private information. Our results indicate that the negative relation between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is primarily caused by the latter mechanism. While information asymmetry is negatively associated with the quality of the annual report and investor relations activities, it is positively associated with quarterly report disclosure quality. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that that the negative association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is stronger in settings characterized by higher levels of firm-investor asymmetry.