Explaining International Differences in Genetically Modified Food Labeling Policies*

Many countries have adopted labeling policies for genetically modified (GM) food, and the regulations vary considerably across countries. We evaluate the importance of political‐economic factors implicit in the choice of GM food labeling regulations. Using an analytical model, we show that production and trade‐related interests play a prominent role in labeling decision‐making. This conclusion is validated by an empirical analysis of GM food labeling policy choices. We find that countries producing GM crops are more likely to have less stringent labeling policies. Food and feed exporters to the European Union (EU) and Japan are more likely to have adopted stricter labeling policies. Labeling regulations in Asia and Europe are similar to those of Japan and the EU. Countries with no labeling policies are less developed, with important rural sectors and are more likely to have ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.     

Fair welfare maximization

We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations. The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an a priori evaluation of any given feasible resource allocation. The fairness ratio for an allocation provides a bound on the discrepancy between this allocation and any other feasible allocation with respect to a large class of social welfare functions. We provide a simple representation of the fairness ratio as well as a general method that can be used to directly determine optimal fair allocations. For general convex environments, we provide a fundamental lower bound for the optimal fairness ratio and show that as the population size increases, the optimal fairness ratio decreases at most logarithmically in what we call the “inhomogeneity” of the problem. Our method yields a unique and “balanced” fair optimum for an important class of problems with linear budget constraints.     

AN EXTENDED MEASURE OF GOVERNMENT PRODUCT: PRELIMINARY RESULTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1946–76

Expanded measures of government output include imputed values of the services of government capital, uncompensated factor services of military draftees and jurors, and net revaluations, as well as the usually included compensation of employees. The government output is allocated to consumption, capital formation and product intermediate to other sectors, on the basis of its classification in ten broad functions: defense, space research, education, health, sanitation, transportation, parks and recreation, natural resources, welfare, and general administration. Final government product in 1976, including $116 billion in defense and $125 billion in education, amounted to $450.5 billion, which was 26.5 percent of the 1976 GNP. This final government product corresponded to the BEA measure of $191.6 billion.
Total capital formation related to government is defined to include both government product which enters into capital formation in other sectors and government expenditures for its own capital accumulation. After a more rapid rate of growth in previous years, this total government capital formation in the United States in 1976 is found to exceed gross private domestic investment. A significant but only minor portion was found to be constituted by government expenditures for capital goods and change in government inventories. Investment in research and development, health and, particularly, education and training, were dominant components in capital formation related to government.     

Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium

In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791, 2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal), which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments, random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular, we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist. This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois.     

Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint: modeling agglomeration,externalities and trade

A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It covers agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities, and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmental externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.      

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

Sectoral Selection and Informality: a Nicaraguan Case Study

Using microdata from the 1998 and 1993 Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement Survey, this paper analyzes the relative size and attractiveness of formal and informal sector employment. Switching regression models of the formal/informal sector employment choice indicate that education across years and gender are the primary determinants of formal sector participation. Furthermore, the formal sector is characterized by positive selection. The results for the informal sector are less definitive, but are also suggestive of positive selection. These findings imply that the informal and formal sectors in Nicaragua contribute positively to the overall economy by attracting those individuals best suited for (in)formal sector employment.     

Keynes and Sraffa's 'Difficulties with J. H. Hollander'

The paper reports on Jacob H. Hollander's cooperation with John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa in the preparation of the latter's edition of The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. The report is based on archive material from various sources, including the unpublished papers of Edwin Cannan, Piero Sraffa, Jacob H. Hollander, John Maynard Keynes, and Jacob Viner, and the archive of the Royal Economic Society. The archive material consulted by us shows that, put mildly, Jacob H. Hollander did not promote Sraffa's editorial project: he held back material which he had received from Frank Ricardo and did not disclose to Sraffa that he owned several important letters which he had privately purchased. Moreover, Sraffa was refused access to Ricardiana even after he had traced them down in laborious detective work to be in Hollander's possession. Hollander's unwillingness to cooperate with Sraffa considerably delayed the publication of the Ricardo edition.