Conditions and intervention strategies for the deliberate acceleration of socio-technical transitions: lessons from a comparative multi-level analysis of two historical case studies in Dutch and Danish heating

ABSTRACT

Policy-oriented transition frameworks such as Strategic Niche Management, Transition Management, and Technological Innovation Systems offer limited analytical traction on deliberately accelerated socio-technical transitions. Using the Multi-Level Perspective as guiding framework, we therefore inductively explore the political acceleration of socio-technical transitions by investigating two deliberately accelerated heating transitions: the transition from coal and oil to natural gas in the Netherlands (1948–1973), and the transition from oil to district heating in Denmark (1945–1990), to draw lessons about the conditions and intervention strategies that facilitate rapid socio-technical change. We find that both cases were characterised by weakened regimes, stabilised niche-innovations, focusing events, and consensus between policymakers and business actors. User resistance was also low in both cases, partly because of public policies. Different focusing events in each case produced problem-driven versus opportunity-driven transition pathways; the former destabilised existing regimes but generated future-oriented uncertainty, while the latter facilitated rapid closure.     

There is no ‘I’ in team: Career concerns,risk‐taking incentives,and team outcomes

The National Basketball Association contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk‐taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player injuries from 1991 to 2013 we measure individual risk‐taking behavior. We find that the average player's likelihood of missing a game due to injury falls by 0.06 percentage points (or over 100% relative to the mean injury rate) in the final 3 months of his contract, and when missing games due to injury is unavoidable, his recovery time drops by 22 days. However, “elite” players with virtually no career concerns actually miss more games due to injury. Finally, we find that elite players missing too many games and “average” players playing before healthy, combine to hurt team performance. For each additional player in the last 3 months on contract, the win probability for that team falls by over 2.6%.     

FDA Regulation of Product Risk and Its Impact Upon Young Biomedical Firms

Data gathered on 62 products from 26 biomedical firms founded in Massachusetts between 1968 and 1975 show a positive relationship between the level of technological sophistication of a firm's products and the risk associated with the use of those products. Oscar Hauptman and Edward Roberts report the results of their study of the impact of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's approval process on these firms' resources and time. They found that young firms dealing with medical devices and pharmaceuticals were more sensitive to this regulatory process than those producing medical auxiliary products. Enactment of the 1976 FDA regulations amendment affecting medical devices apparently created a precarious environment for the marketing of new products. The amendment was found to have significant impact beyond its target product area, medical devices and supplies. It also challenged the management of firms producing drugs and Pharmaceuticals.     

闪存卡成为存储卡市场的佼佼者

SanDisk公司在快速发展的存储卡市场挺立潮头以前,如果SanDisk公司获得一笔价值10万美元的订单,就会有员工喜气洋洋地拿着铃铛在办公室里跑来跑去,告诉每一     

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy

Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor regulations independently from income tax responsibilities. We characterize firms’ entry and evasion behavior and find that the design of the tax system can generate both positive and negative correlations between evasion decisions consistent with what is observed empirically. We then characterize optimal government policies given the firms’ decisions. We obtain intuitive optimal tax rules that highlight the trade‐offs the government faces when firms have multiple margins on which to evade.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.