Discriminatory Prices,Predation and Signal-Jamming in a Horizontal Differentiation Model

We study the effects of predation in an asymmetric duopoly model à la Hotelling in which the incumbent is able to price discriminate while the entrant sets a uniform price. We show that when the discount factor is high (low) enough and the incumbent accommodates entrance the incumbent initially sets a uniform price (discriminatory prices) and then engages in price discrimination. Under certain conditions, the entrant prices aggressively in order to discourage predation from the incumbent: predation actually does not occur and all equilibrium prices are lower with respect to the case in which the threat of predation is absent. In a T-period model, we derive conditions under which the equilibrium prices increase over time until they stabilize at the level that would result in the absence of the threat of predation.     

Determinants of corporate capital structure: evidence from Hungarian firms

This paper investigates the capital structure of Hungarian firms using a cross-section and a panel data approach. The data set is composed of balance sheet data and information on market structure for 1100 firms from 1992 to 1996. Evidence is found of imperfections that constrain firms in the achievement of their optimal capital structure, but also some positive indications: there are no distortions typical of the planned system and no signs of the presence of soft budget constraints.     

Random Price Discrimination

When a monopolist randomly sorts customers, price discrimination “concavifies” the revenue function of the firm, so that it may be optimal for a monopolist to divide customers into groups that have the same demand function and charge them different prices. It is impossible to rule out this type of result whenever the revenue function is somewhere convex in the “economically relevant” set of quantities, because there always exists a non-decreasing cost function that leads to that conclusion. It is also impossible to rule out the case where, with respect to monopoly, the firm raises or lowers price to all classes and, accordingly, the case where the social welfare decreases or increases. Received December 13, 2001; revised version received June 3, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 I am indebted to Carlo Beretta, Giuseppe Colangelo, Umberto Galmarini, Guido Merzoni, Gerd Weinrich and especially to Carla Peri for helpful discussions and comments. I have also benefited from insightful suggestions of three anonymous referees. Finally, I wish to thank participants to seminars at the Catholic University of Milan and University of Bologna. The usual disclaimer applies. Funds from MIUR are gratefully acknowledged.     

Inter-firm knowledge diffusion, market power, and welfare

We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the long run impact of inter-firm knowledge diffusion on market power, i.e. the ability of a firm to raise the price above the marginal cost, and welfare. We consider two types of processes through which knowledge is acquired: (i) passive learning, or learning-by-doing, where managers do not actively invest in information and (ii) active learning, or learning-by-investing, where managers acquire new and additional information through specific investments in human capital. We show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion reduces market power; under (ii), knowledge diffusion reduces market power as long as learning spillovers are sufficiently important. From a welfare viewpoint, we also show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion is always welfare-enhancing; under (ii), weak spillovers are required in order for knowledge diffusion to be welfare-enhancing.     

An indifference result concerning collusion in spatial frameworks

Using a general spatial model with two firms interacting repeatedly, we show that the condition for collusion sustainability is the same under uniform delivered pricing, discriminatory delivered pricing and discriminatory f.o.b. pricing.     

Modelling Intra-Group Relationships

Within a group of companies, a model is given for management of the relationships between the parent company and its subsidiaries. This is particularly relevant for groups originating from mergers and takeovers, because firms acquired often differ substantially in organizational structure from each other and from the parent company. The model provides a means of harmonizing the organizational structures of parent company and subsidiaries, so as to provide a complete coverage of necessary activities without duplication, and a means of identifying which activities should, in economic terms, be centralized by the parent company, and which should be delegated to the subsidiary. Finally, there is an empirical application of the model to one of the principal Italian banking groups.