Arithmetic versus geometric mean estimators: Setting discount rates for capital budgeting

This paper addresses an issue central to the estimation of discount rates for capital budgeting: should the geometric mean or arithmetic mean of past data be used when estimating the discount rate? the use of the arithmetic mean ignores estimation error and serial correlation in returns. Unbiased discount factors have been derived that correct for both these effects. In all cases, the corrected discount rates are closer to the arithmetic than the geometric mean.     

Using data envelopment analysis to measure the efficiency of not-for-profit organizations: A critical evaluation—comment

This note responds to Nunamaker (1985) who supposedly deals with deficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as an approach for (1) measuring efficiencies of not-for-profit entities identified as Decision Making Units (DMUs) and (2) locating sources and amounts of inefficiencies in each of the inputs used and in each of the outputs produced by each DMU. Corrections and comments are offered with references supplied for interested readers who wish to examine more detailed treatments of the topics covered.     

Auditing and accounting for program efficiency and management efficiency in not-for-profit entities

A measure of efficiency for not-for-profit entities - developed by the authors in association with Edward Rhodes - is explained and illustrated by data from Program Follow Through, a large scale social experiment in U.S. public school education. A division into Follow Through and Non-Follow Through participants facilitates a distinction between “program efficiency” and “managerial efficiency” which is also illustrated and examined for its use in evaluating such programs. Relations to comprehensive audits and other possible uses are explored.     

A multiplicative model for efficiency analysis

This paper develops theory and algorithms for a “multiplicative” Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model employing virtual outputs and inputs as does the CCR ratio method for efficiency analysis. The frontier production function results here are of piecewise log-linear rather than piecewise linear form.     

The integration of a logistical decision-making framework into nonprofit marketing

Marketing practitioners in for-profit-making settings are typically well acquainted with what logistical decisions can do for a marketing program and what marketing constraints can do to a logistics system. For the most part, however, the conceptual tansfer from a product-oriented firm to a service-producing organization has been lacking and obviously not made in non-profit marketing situations. This paper examines these areas and presents a creative expansion of the logistics decision-making area into nonprofit marketing. Hopefully, this setting will encourage others to investigate non-profit areas and, in particular, the interrelationships involved in the logistics area.     

Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior

Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. This article considers how such biases affect regulatory decisions. The article posits a simple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the political overseer—whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs that garner political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes—and the weight the regulator puts on the optimal long run policy. Flawed heuristics and myopia are likely to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences of political overseers than they would otherwise. The incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically expedient policies, either intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality). The article urges that careful thought be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls seek to correct firm biases. The article proposes measures that focus rewards to regulators on outcomes rather than outputs as a way to help ameliorate regulatory biases.     

International Propagation of the Credit Crisis: Lessons for Bank Regulation*

The authors use a large sample of non‐U.S. banks to examine the origins and spread of the 2007–2009 crisis. Using both stock market and structural variables, they test whether the effects of the crisis on individual banks are better explained by crisis models or by the VaR‐type analysis of the Basel system. The latter emphasizes risk weightings for individual assets while ignoring linkages that could leave banks exposed to systemic shocks. Consistent with crisis models, the authors find that a small set of pre‐crisis measures of a bank's international linkages, leverage, and the fragility of its liability structure does a good job of discriminating between banks that suffered a large impact and those that did not. (Indeed, these measures explain almost 50% of the differences among banks' stock returns during the crisis period, and almost 40% of the changes in the variability of those returns.) The authors also provide evidence of both a direct linkage among banks' stock returns and an indirect linkage that could reflect either linkages in the real economy or common demands by investors for liquidity. The authors run a “horse race” that demonstrates that simple measures of book leverage were better predictors of bank performance than the Basel capital ratios. They find that banks with lower Basel risk weightings prior to the crisis proved, on average, to be more exposed to the crisis. The authors' explanation is that banks with lower Basel risk measures tended to operate with higher leverage and more aggressive funding strategies, which in turn exposed them to greater crisis risk (even as they conformed to the letter of the Basel system in terms of asset risk measures). Finally, the authors find no evidence that substandard governance was a separate contributing factor to crisis exposure. Banks with substantial international business that were exposed to systemic shocks had high governance scores.