Cultural Readjustment After Crisis: Regulation and Learning from Crisis Within the UK Soccer Industry*

abstract Challenging Turner's (1976 , 1978 ) implicit assumption that cultural readjustment typically follows a crisis, this paper examines the evolution of the regulation of safety management within the UK soccer industry since 1946. Employing a longitudinal case study approach, the industry's response to four crises is examined. This study explores the industry's response to changes in the regulatory framework, through the lens of Gouldner's (1954 ) patterns of industrial bureaucracy and institutional theory. The persistence of indulgent and mock patterns of behaviour, following a series of disasters, challenges Turner's implicit assumption. Although a move towards a punitive approach to regulatory behaviour effected some changes, there was limited evidence of cultural readjustment due in part to a ‘mindset of invulnerability’ ( Wicks, 2001 ). This included the fixed belief that hooligan behaviour was the primary problem facing the industry. Our findings suggest that more participative forms of regulation encourage more effective learning from crisis because they challenge core organizational and individual assumptions.     

Deconstructing the notion of blame in corporate failure

Corporate failure is the subject of considerable academic debate since the 1960s. Failure in the retail sector receives less attention however. This paper addresses the notion of blame in corporate failure. Reference to A Goldberg and Sons, a failed retailer, exemplifies the discussion. Prior to bankruptcy in 1990, this firm was a successful Scottish department store and clothing retailer. The study takes a historical approach, using in-depth interviews, archival material, and other secondary data sources. Findings reveal that, despite warning signs from various key performance indicators and external reviews, the company's board failed to act appropriately. A series of bad strategic decisions contributed to the company's failure. In line with theories of blame attribution, through their (in)actions, the board's negligence played a major role in the firm's demise.     

Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.     

INVESTIGATING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO HARMONISE MULTI-REGIONAL INPUT–OUTPUT DATA

Over recent years a small number of global multi-regional input–output (MRIO) databases were developed to describe the entire global economy at high sector detail. We investigate the differences that arise out of applying different construction procedures for two global MRIO databases: The EXIOBASE database, developed as part of the EU FP6 & 7 programs and the Eora database developed at the University of Sydney. The procedures used in EXIOBASE involve a high degree of interrogation and adjustment throughout the construction of the data set, whilst the Eora MRIO relies on single-step mathematical programming techniques and high-performance computing. We unravel the effect of the different approaches taken to develop the databases by undertaking a number of combinatorial experiments in which we exchange parts of the construction process between the EXIOBASE and Eora build pipelines. We conclude that Eora's highly automated data reconciliation approach produces MRIO databases that are of comparable quality to those constructed with EXIOBASE's multi-step approach. However, the reliability and robustness of the resulting MRIO database largely depend on the level of detail and reliability of the underlying raw data.     

Arctic ‘concessions’ and icebreaker diplomacy? Chinese tourism development in Iceland

This paper is based on a case study on a Chinese investment proposal in Iceland and sets out to explore the different ways in which actors from different backgrounds, with an extensive range of expectations and ideas of what a destination could and should be, produce and sustain ideas about tourism development. Our point of departure is how tourism represents a new globalised economic expansion possibly reflecting processes of empire building of days gone by. This research suggests that the conflicting worlds of Chinese investment plans, seemingly pregnant with imperial aspirations, core-periphery dichotomies, as well as contesting ideas of regional development, represent a need to begin re-thinking our understanding of tourism regional development from the perspective of what empires are.     

Executive compensation and goodwill recognition under IFRS: Evidence from European mergers

Based on principal agent theory we posit that managers account for a business combination opportunistically by recognizing goodwill in excess of its economic determinants. We examine the relationship between CEOs’ short-term cash bonuses and the amount of goodwill recognized in IFRS acquisitions. We find that with increasing cash bonus intensity managers recognize more goodwill. More detailed analysis indicates that this relationship is not a linear one. Instead, there seems to be a corridor in which CEOs are susceptible to the incentive given by bonus payments. In particular, the relationship seems to be fulfilled only for CEOs whose cash bonus is between 150% and 200% of their base salary prior to the acquisition. Our findings have an implication for companies that bonus caps should be introduced to limit CEOs’ bonuses to a given percentage of their base salary. By doing so, they may re-align shareholders’ and managers’ interests and avoid an increased impairment risk in the future.