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71.
Preponderance of evidence 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of negligence when evidence about injurers’ behavior is imperfect. We show that a “more-likely-than-not” decision rule provides maximal incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care. An injurer is then held liable whenever inadequate care appears more likely than due care, and not liable otherwise. Our analysis provides a deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rules of evidence found in common law and the preponderance of evidence standard of proof. 相似文献
72.
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a
class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph
games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like
this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that
each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties
in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations.
This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The
research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics.
Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme
for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the
Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We
thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 相似文献
73.
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76.
Decomposing Redistributive Effects of Taxes and Transfers in Australia: Annual and Lifetime Measures
This paper decomposes the redistributive effect on annual and lifetime inquality of a range of taxes and transfers in Australia, using a dynamic cohort lifetime simulation model. The redistributive effect is decomposed into vertical, horizontal and reranking effects. Horizontal inequities in the tax and transfer system are found to be negligible. The extent of reranking is greater in the lifetime than in the annual context and is affected by the equivalence scales used to adjust household incomes. If no adjustment is made to household incomes, reranking is about nine per cent of the reduction in lifetime inequality. However, if each child is counted as equivalent to one-third of an adult, reranking is found to be less than one per cent. 相似文献
77.
Joïlle Noailly Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh Cees A. Withagen 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):183-200
Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters
are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current
paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual
harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population
is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits
are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part
in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex
dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic
paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under
certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run.
Correspondence to: J. Noailly 相似文献
78.
79.
Dominique Lepelley 《Economic Theory》1996,7(3):491-500
Summary A constant scoring rule asks each individual to vote for a given (and constant) number of alternatives and the alternative with the most votes is elected. A sequential constant scoring rule applies this principle in a process of sequential elimination. Constant scoring rules as well as sequential constant scoring rules fail to satisfy Condorcet criteria when individual preferences are unrestricted. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if we assume that preferences are single-peaked, then some constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion and some sequential constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The results we provide make possible the identification of these rules.I thank Maurice Salles and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 相似文献
80.
The ‘wage space’, which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth, has played a major role as an indicator of allowable wage increases in the post-war wage negotiations in the Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wages and the wage space are co-integrated; (b) the deviation between wages and the wage space may act as an error correction term in the wage equation when both variables are identified as I(2); and (c) political consensus and the threat of labour conflicts (rather than actual strike activity) may be identified as the ‘mechanism’ behind this error correction in the wage equation. 相似文献