The good,the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations

Current literature has largely ignored the fact that some organizations are highly selective when admitting new agents while others are more open. In addition, some organizations audit or sort agent behavior within the organization more aggressively than others. One might expect a priori that closed, highly selective, organizations would always be more efficient because they screen out the worst types, which could lead to better agent behavior. We show that this is not the case. Specifically, when agent behavior in equilibrium is uniform across organizations (i.e., when the number of agents behaving the same way is identical), closed organizations are inefficient. However, when agent behavior varies across organizations, closed organizations may or may not be inefficient, depending on net payoffs to the organization and the agents. Our analysis implies that organizations should choose the open type when screening or sorting costs are high, when there is a high frequency of good agent types in the population, when agent misbehavior does not reduce output significantly, and when penalties for misbehavior are large. The paper has benefitted from useful comments by David Flath, Charles Knoeber, Claudio Mezzetti, two anonymous referees and participants of the Spring 2005 Midwest Economic Theory meetings at Vanderbilt University, the 2005 meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Vigo, Spain, the 2005 conference on Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics in Syros, Greece, and workshops at North Carolina State University, Texas A&M University and McGill University.     

The relationship between attitudes toward diversity management in the Southwest USA and the GLOBE study cultural preferences

This study investigates the importance of diversity management as it relates to the GLOBE study cultural preferences. A survey of 225 students in undergraduate and graduate programs at a private Texas University concluded that collectivism was a strong predictor of how positively participants rated their organizations support for diversity, diversity recruitment efforts, diversity training for mentors, and employees with disabilities. The participants were nontraditional students who were also employed in a wide array of organizations. Collectivism and assertiveness were both strong predictors with regard to participant's ratings of chief executive officer (CEO) support of diversity and the organization's overall diversity training. With regard to leadership dimensions, humane-oriented leadership was a positive predictor of preference for a collective culture, which predicts diversity management ratings. Team-oriented leadership also predicted ratings of diversity management. The results of the study indicate that promoting a more collectivist rather than individualistic culture is associated with the increased rating of organizational diversity practices. Furthermore, it strengthens the argument that with the increase in globalization, organizations must be prepared to re-evaluate their policies and know when to adapt to changes in organizational culture.     

Employee involvement,the quality of training and the learning environment: an individual level analysis

Theories such as human capital theory, the metaphors of learning and the high involvement work paradigm all suggest that the quality of training and learning varies along a number of axes. This article shows how these theoretical insights have been translated into questions used in a UK survey of 6829 employees carried out in 2006. We find that the qualities of both the training experience and on-the-job learning are strongly associated with the extent and nature of employee involvement. This suggests that employee involvement is likely to play an important role in the process of upskilling the workforce, which has been accorded a central role in the economic strategies of many nation states as well as supra-national organizations such as the European Union.     

Zero Hours Contracts and Their Growth

This article studies the prevalence and nature of zero hours contracts (ZHCs) in the UK labour market. It is widely argued that the headline count of ZHC workers based on the Labour Force Survey historically underestimated the number of workers in ZHC jobs. Here, we argue that this likely continues to be the case, particularly if one considers other, similar, no-guaranteed-hours jobs alongside ZHCs. ZHC jobs and workers are heterogeneous, but ZHCs have become increasingly concentrated among young workers, full-time students, migrants, black and minority ethnic workers, in personal service and elementary occupations, and in the distribution, accommodation and restaurant sector over time. Compared to other forms of employment, median wages in ZHC jobs have also fallen. The most common prior labour market state for ZHC workers is non-ZHC employment, particularly part-time employment, with part of the reported growth in ZHCs driven by reclassification of existing employment relationships. Finally, we show that growth in public awareness of ZHCs contributed substantially to recent growth in reported ZHCs, particularly over the period 2013/14.     

Digitalisierungsschub in Firmen während der Corona-Pandemie

Wirtschaftsdienst - Durch die Corona-Pandemie haben digitale Technologien in Unternehmen an Bedeutung gewonnen. Auf Basis einer Betriebsbefragung des Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und...     

Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets

Tournament compensation of asset traders has been shown to promote deconvergence from intrinsic value pricing in an experimental asset market where all traders are so compensated (James and Isaac 2000). This paper explores the extent of this effect as experimental design parameters—proportion of traders facing tournament compensation, details of the tournament contract, and time horizon of the asset being traded—are varied. We find that the original results are replicated using the original parameters, that a tournament contract modified to provide a penalty for underperformance does not necessarily eliminate the effect, and that reducing the proportion of traders facing tournament compensation to half the market largely eliminates the effect.