Hypocrisy pay

Emotional labor—putting on an act asrequired explicitly orimplicitly in work situations-is very often psychologically, emotionally, and mentally damaging to most employees. As for soldiers in wartime who receive combat pay, it is suggested that such employees be specially compensated for their emotional labor with hypocrisy pay. Another solution is to select only those who are immune to such stress for jobs involving emotional labor—an ideal that probably cannot be achieved in all cases. Another assessment is that such special compensation is unwarranted.     

Vergleich des verallgemeinerten nichtzentralent-Tests mit dem Binomialtest

Zusammenfassung Es sei {F _,(x); –<<, >0} mitF _,(x)=F((x–)/)–F(x) eine standardisierte Verteilungsfunktion — die Familie der zulässigen Verteilungsfunktionen. Der (früher eingeführte) verallgemeinerte nichtzentralet-Test für die Hypothese {PP ₀} mitP:=F _,(x ₀) gegen die Alternative {P>P ₀} zum Niveau wird mit dem entsprechenden nichtparametrischen Test (Test für die Hypothese {pP ₀} über den Parameterp einer Binomialverteilung gegen die Alternative {p>P ₀}) verglichen. Für dent-Test wird die relative asymptotische Effizienz bestimmt.Beide Tests lassen sich als Tests für das zur WahrscheinlichkeitP ₀ gehörende Quantil einer Verteilungsfunktion interpretieren. Der klassische zentrale Student-Test ergibt sich als Spezialfall (F(x)=(x),P ₀=0,5).

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Summary Let {F _,(x);–<<, >0} withF _,(x ₀):=F((x–)/–F(x) a standarized distribution function — the family of admissible distribution functions. The (earlier introduced) generalized noncentralt-test for the hypothesis {PP ₀} withP:=F _,(x ₀) against the alternative {P>P ₀} at level of significance is compared with the corresponding nonparametric test (Binomial test). The relative asymptotic efficiency of thet-test is determined. Both kinds of tests can be interpreted as quantiltests. In caseF(x)=(x),P ₀=0,5 one gets the classical central Student-test.

     

The relationship between performance appraisal criterion specificity and statistical evidence of discrimination

Plaintiffs' expert witnesses in EEO cases involving performance appraisals often claim that adverse impact is a result of the type of rating format used. Their theory is that more specific rating criteria will lead to lessened adverse impact. We tested that theory by comparing data from a simple category‐based rating system against data from a standards‐based Work Planning and Review appraisal system with over 248,000 performance appraisals of state employees. Using logistic regression and statistical definitions of prima facie discrimination, we found no support for the hypothesis that adverse impact is materially affected by criterion specificity. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Sub additive measures of relative information and inaccuracy

Summary In the study of information theoretic measures, additivity has been the basic requirement. However it is quite interesting to investigate the sub-additive measures. Starting from subadditivity for measures associated with a pair of distributions of a discrete random variable, it has been changed into an equality relation using another function of a pair of distributions., Under the sum property of the function and the measures, the relation is expressed in terms of a functional equation of which the most general complex solutions have been obtained. In terms of the real continuous solutions of the functional equation, the sub-additive measures of Relative information and Inaccuracy have been defined and characterized. Particular cases and simple properties particularly the convexities of some of these new measures have also been studied.     

Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.     

Assessing French nursing home efficiency: An indirect approach via budget-constrained DEA models

In this paper, data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques are applied to the French nursing home industry in order to address two policy issues. The first involves nursing home size and returns to scale, while the second deals with the potential effects of a change in nursing home reimbursement from a flat rate to one based on the severity of case-mix. To accomplish this, our analysis expands on the existing nursing home literature to analyze technical and allocative efficiency along with budget-constrained models rather than the more common direct input-based distance function. Technical efficiency is evaluated via an indirect output distance function while allocative output efficiency is computed with a cost indirect revenue function. The findings suggest that system-wide efficiency and equity may result from coming reforms since payments would more accurately reflect resource use.     

Revisiting managerial perspectives on dividend policy

We survey managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividends. The evidence shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and widely agree that changes in dividends affect firm value. Managers give the strongest support to a signaling explanation for paying dividends, weak to little support for the tax-preference and agency cost explanations, and no support to the bird-in-the-hand explanation. The study provides new evidence about how managers view dividend life cycles and residual dividend policy. The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and Maheshan Fernando and Sumeet Chawla for providing research assistance.     

Learning-by-doing and the sources of productivity growth: A dynamic model with application to U.S. agriculture

The significance of learning to productivity growth is formulated within a dynamic adjustment-cost framework. Explicitly treating the acquisition of knowledge as a firm-specific capital good entering the production function along with other conventional inputs, the dynamic optimization model integrates the learning-by-doing hypothesis with technical change, scale, and disequilibrium input use effects in the aggregate productivity analysis. The theoretical framework is applied to examining the dynamic components accounting for the growth of U.S. production agriculture over the 1950–82 period. The results imply a less important role for technical change and assign a substantial role to the previously unmeasured contribution of learning-by-doing to the growth of aggregate agriculture industry.The editor for this paper was Melvyn Fuss.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

Keeping Two Sets of Books: The Relationship Between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices

Multinational enterprises use two types of transfer prices: the tax transfer price to achieve optimal tax outcomes and the incentive transfer price to provide appropriate incentives to offshore managers. The two optimal transfer prices are independent if taxable income is assessed using the formula apportionment approach. Under the separate entity approach, however, they are interdependent: they both decrease as the penalty for noncompliance with the arm's length principle increases; and the tax transfer price decreases and the incentive transfer price increases as the marginal cost of production increases. We also examine the case where the incentive transfer price is negotiated rather than dictated by the parent. The results are robust to different market structures and tax environments.