Relationships in business markets: Exchange episodes,value creation,and their empirical assessment

Conclusion David Wilson (1995) has provided us with much grist for thought with his integrated framework for customer-supplier relationship development. In focusing on which constructs are “active” and therefore most meaningful at each stage, he has opened a new vista for research in this area. Our models and empirical research ought to reflect this, but to date they largely have not. I have suggested qualitative, longitudinal research as a preferred next step in gaining the knowledge that we will need to make field-survey, longitudinal research worthwhile. Wilson also is to be lauded for drawing greater attention to value creation as a central undertaking in customer-supplier relationships. Understanding and actualizing value creation (and value sharing) are critical aspects of the market-sensing and customer-linking capabilities in market-driven organizations (Day 1994), yet the mechanisms underlying them and the methodologies for accurately assessing them remain largely unknown. Here, particularly for tool development research, it would seem to be an opportune time for business marketing academics and practitioners to form their own collaborative relationships for mutual gain. His research interests are in working relationships between firms in business markets and measurement techniques. His articles have appeared inHarvard Business Review, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Management Science, Psychological Bulletin, andPsychometrika, among others. He has been vice president of the Business Marketing Division of the American Marketing Association and is a fellow of the American Psychological Association.     

Banks and the stability of the international financial system

Summary Does today's banking scene pose a potential threat to the stability of the international financial system? The article discusses three possible sources of vulnerability of the international banking system: a major bank failure causing a general banking crisis via the extensive interbank linkages; the systemic risks allegedly inherent in certain new (as well as traditional) financial products; and the impact of external events such as debt crises, violent swings in exchange or interest rates, deregulation and recession. The author's conclusion is twofold: systemic risks clearly exist, but the probability of a major banking crisis tends to be greatly exaggerated. Banks not only survived the various crises of the seventies and eighties; they also learned in the process. Capital and reserves have been strengthened, provisions for country risk and for general contingencies have increased, supervision has been tightened and it is exercised on a comprehensive as well as a world-wide consolidated basis (i.e. including all contingent and off-balance liabilities, and all offshore activities). Assuming reasonably intelligent policies on the part of the monetary authorities and adequate international coordination, a general banking crisis can be avoided. Official rescue operations do, however, raise difficult questions of an ethical, political and economic nature.     

Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

This note uses the Theorem of the Alternative to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.     

Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

Robert Wilson criticizes applied game theory's reliance on common-knowledge assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of mechanism design has adopted the goal of finding detail-free mechanisms in order to eliminate this reliance. In practice this has meant restricting attention to simple mechanisms such as dominant-strategy mechanisms. However, there has been little theoretical foundation for this approach. In particular it is not clear the search for an optimal mechanism that does not rely on common-knowledge assumption would lead to simpler mechanisms rather than more complicated ones. This paper tries to fill the void. In the context of an expected revenue maximizing auctioneer, we investigate some foundations for using simple, dominant-strategy auctions.