SLIPPAGE AND THE CHOICE OF MARKET OR LIMIT ORDERS IN FUTURES TRADING

Retail futures traders face uncertainty regarding the price they will obtain when trading. This price "surprise," known as slippage, can be substantial. Using unique data from an introducing brokerage for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat, corn, and soybean futures contracts, we quantify time-to-clear and the magnitude of slippage. We then identify factors that affect these trade quality measures. Finally, we analyze individual trader choice between market and limit orders and find that the likelihood of placing limit orders, where regulations protect traders from slippage, is greater when order and market characteristic indicate that adverse slippage is likely.     

Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions

Recent empirical research has shown that, from deal to deal, serial acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are declining. This has been most often attributed to CEOs hubris. We question this interpretation. Our theoretical analysis shows that (i) a declining CAR from deal to deal is not sufficient to reveal the presence of hubris, (ii) if CEOs are learning, economically motivated and rational, a declining CAR from deal to deal should be observed, (iii) predictions can be derived about the impact of learning and hubris on the time between successive deals and, finally, (iv) predictions about the CAR and about the time between successive deal trends lead to testable empirical hypotheses.     

Handling Missing Data by Re-approaching Non-respondents

When handling missing data, a researcher should be aware of the mechanism underlying the missingness. In the presence of non-randomly missing data, a model of the missing data mechanism should be included in the analyses to prevent the analyses based on the data from becoming biased. Modeling the missing data mechanism, however, is a difficult task. One way in which knowledge about the missing data mechanism may be obtained is by collecting additional data from non-respondents. In this paper the method of re-approaching respondents who did not answer all questions of a questionnaire is described. New answers were obtained from a sample of these non-respondents and the reason(s) for skipping questions was (were) probed for. The additional data resulted in a larger sample and was used to investigate the differences between respondents and non-respondents, whereas probing for the causes of missingness resulted in more knowledge about the nature of the missing data patterns.     

ATKINSON AND BOURGUIGNON'S DOMINANCE CRITERIA: EXTENDED AND APPLIED TO THE MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY IN FRANCE

We demonstrate that the criteria put forward by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) can be satisfactorily applied to the analysis of poverty even when the demographic composition of society and the definition of poverty change over time. We show that they provide both sufficient and necessary conditions for any robust conclusions concerning the changes in welfare and poverty. We apply these criteria to a set of data tracking annual income distribution movements in France from 1977 to 1994. The Atkinson and Bourguignon criteria posit that recent changes in poverty are a function of macroeconomic fluctuations in activity.     

When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation,executive core self-evaluation,and firm performance

We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Homeownership and Child Welfare

Recent studies have concluded that homeownership is beneficial to children. This result is important because it is used to justify large government subsidies that encourage homeownership. We reexamine the results of two of the most prominent of these studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Public Use Microsample, and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data. We extend this research by controlling for residential mobility, wealth, dwelling type and vehicle ownership, as well as by using a "differences in differences" methodology to deal with possible treatment effects bias. We find that the beneficial effects of homeownership previously measured are substantially reduced or eliminated by controlling for these factors. We confirm these results using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study.     

AN ARBITRAGE PRICING APPROACH TO EVALUATING MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE

A test procedure, derived from arbitrage pricing theory, that permits the measurement of the security selection performance of professional portfolio managers is developed and applied to a sample of mutual funds over the period of the 1970's. The evidence indicates that more than one factor was present in the market during that interval as a systematic influence on the profile of securities returns. Consistent with prior studies, the evidence also suggests that mutual fund portfolios did not outperform a passive buy-and-hold investment strategy. A comparative analysis of the same data, using performance measures based on the single-factor market model, produces similar but less powerful results, both in the aggregate and at the individual fund level.     

The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism

The absence of a formal international regulatory mechanism tofacilitate sovereign debt restructuring has long been recognizedas a most serious gap in the architecture of global finance.Why has it proven so difficult to create such a sovereign debtrestructuring mechanism (SDRM) at the international level? Politicaleconomists have devoted relatively little scholarly attentionto this question. This paper attempts to begin to fill thisgap in the literature by examining four failed initiatives tocreate a SDRM over the past century. In place of a realist orstructural Marxist account, the paper puts forward a more contingentexplanation for these failures that highlights three distinctpolitical problems that must be overcome in the constructionof a SDRM: (1) collective action problems on both the side ofsovereign debtors and that of private foreign creditors; (2)basic distributional conflicts embodied in any debt restructuringeffort; and (3) the uncertain behavior of the private creditors'home states.