Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

We analyze how shareholders screen management proposals at annualgeneral meetings. First, we use a simple model of strategicvoting to develop a theoretical benchmark of effective informationaggregation through voting. Then, we derive testable implicationsand provide structural estimates of the model parameters. Themain conclusions are that shareholders vote strategically andthat proposal screening increases value. Shareholders largelyneutralize the lock-in effect of supermajority rules, therebypreventing the incorrect rejection of proposals.     

OP-Abdeckungen und Kleidung unter der Lupe

Im OP ist der Patient grunds?tzlich durch den Eintrag von Krankheitserregern und Partikeln gef?hrdet, die in die offene Wunde gelangen k?nnen. Dieses Risiko gilt es auch durch geeignete Abdeckungen und Schutzkleidung so gering wie m?glich zu halten. Welche Anforderungen sind aus hygienischer Sicht zu stellen?     

VALUATION OF FLOATING RANGE NOTES IN LÉVY TERM-STRUCTURE MODELS

Turnbull (1995) as well as Navatte and Quittard-Pinon (1999) derived explicit pricing formulae for digital options and range notes in a one-factor Gaussian Heath–Jarrow–Morton (henceforth HJM) model. Nunes (2004) extended their results to a multifactor Gaussian HJM framework. In this paper, we generalize these results by providing explicit pricing solutions for digital options and range notes in the multivariate Lévy term-structure model of Eberlein and Raible (1999) , that is, an HJM-type model driven by a d -dimensional (possibly nonhomogeneous) Lévy process. As a byproduct, we obtain a pricing formula for floating range notes in the special case of a multifactor Gaussian HJM model that is simpler than the one provided by Nunes (2004) .     

Human Resources Management Innovation

Guided by a general manager's perspective of human resources management (HRM), this paper identifies key factor affecting the introduction of HRM innovations in organizations. Because the essence of market and technological leadership is the development of the organizational capacity to carry out inventive ideas, it is critical to understand the main forces influencing HRM innovation. Following a definition of HRM innovation, six propositions are discussed using current and historical examples. Since HRM innovation also involves change in the social system of the organization, the adoption and diffusion of these innovations can be attributed not only to external environmental forces but also to social processes.     

Comparing evolutionary dynamics across different national settings: the case of the synthetic dye industry, 1857–1914

Current models of industry evolution suggest that development patterns should be the same across different levels of analysis. In comparing the evolution of the synthetic dye industry at the global level and in the five major producer countries before World War I (Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland and the United States), it is shown that patterns of industry evolution differed significantly across national contexts. Based on a quantitative and qualitative database of all firms and plants in the industry, the paper analyzes how German firms came to dominate the industry and identifies factors such as availabilities of crucial skills, economies of scale and scope, and positive feedback mechanisms between firms and national institutions that likely produced these national differences. The empirical analysis calls for formal models of evolution that incorporate differences in institutional environments.     

Explicit solution of a general consumption/portfolio problem with subsistence consumption and bankruptcy

This paper solves a general continuous-time single-agent consumption and portfolio decision problem with subsistence consumption in closed form. The analysis allows for general continuously differentiable concave utility functions. The model takes into consideration that consumption must be no smaller than a given subsistence rate and that bankruptcy can occur. Thus the paper generalizes the results of Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi, and Shreve (1986).     

Cost effects of mergers and deregulation in the U.S. Rail industry

We attempt to disentangle the effects of deregulation on rail costs from those directly attributable to mergers and acquisitions, employing a translog variable cost function, based on an unbalanced panel data set of annual observations for major U.S. Class I railroads from 1974 to 1986. We find that both deregulation and mergers contributed significantly to cost savings. However, of the accumulated cost savings achieved by the six major firms involved in mergers postderegulation, we estimate that by 1986 about 91% of the reduction in accumulated costs is due to deregulation, and about 9% is directly due to mergers and acquisitions (which in turn were facilitated by regulatory reforms).