Are House Prices Responsible for Unemployment Persistence?

The paper analyses the ambiguous role of house prices and housing investment for unemployment dynamics. Whereas traditional models see an increase in house prices as a dynamic multiplier that contributes positively to business cycle swings, the paper considers additional transmission mechanisms via the competitiveness channel (wages) and productivity. As house prices rise, wages tend to follow in order to make up for the loss in real disposable income, which limits employment creation. In addition, with rising house prices, the relative size of the construction sector – a low-productivity industry – tends to increase, lowering aggregate productivity growth, further dampening competitiveness. The paper estimates a stylised dynamic general equilibrium model with unemployment flows. Introducing different transmission mechanisms through which the housing market influences labour and macroeconomic dynamics, the size and direction of the housing market channel is being analysed. The estimation results show that housing shocks can have long-lasting negative effects on employment even though a housing boom can generate a short-lived stimulus on growth and employment. The paper also offers some policy advice simulating housing shocks under different types of structural reforms and macro-prudential regulation.     

Überfordern höhere Rentenniveaus die Jungen und sind sie nicht finanzierbar?

Higher pension payments can be borne because the effects of the demographic development, e.g. a higher share of pensioners, will be compensated by rising real incomes. Furthermore, the government projection of pension payments through 2045 shows that abolishing the Riester system will be cheaper than keeping it. The beneficial side effect will be the prevention of poverty.     

Information Asymmetries as Antecedents of Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Testing Principal-Agent Theory

ABSTRACT

Purpose: A severe problem in supplier selection refers to moral hazard: suppliers not behaving in the expected way once contracted. Principal-agent theory could provide insights on how to reduce this problem. Because buyer–supplier relationships can be interpreted as principal-agent situations, the application of agency theory should facilitate improved supplier selection. Although theoretically compelling, empirical tests verifying this assumption are not prevalent. Regarding the advancement of theory, this paper tests whether both ex ante and ex post information asymmetries influence moral hazard. In particular, in the context of a globalizing economy with a subsequent increase in information asymmetries as a problem in supplier selection, this conceptual approach may be contributive.

Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a set of 87 buyer–supplier relationships to conduct a test, applying a partial least squares model with latent variables. A particularity of the data set is that it contains information on ongoing as well as on discontinued relationships.

Findings: The analysis indicated that both ex ante information asymmetries (operationalized by a reputation variable) and ex post asymmetries (operationalized by a monitoring variable) have shown to be significant and strong antecedents explaining the occurrence of moral hazard. Interestingly, and opposed to the common assumption, the length of a relationship and the amount of direct meetings have not revealed any explanatory significance. Buyer dependency hardly showed influence on supplier opportunism.

Research limitations/implications: Data were collected from a multitude of buyer–supplier relationships from a single firm in the chemical-pharmaceutical industry. Generalizations to other industries still need to be tested. Socially desirable answering behavior cannot fully be excluded because relationship discontinuation is not a desirable situation. In terms of theory implications, this research adds to the notion that both hidden action and hidden intention can lead to moral hazard.

Practical implications: An agency-based analysis can be operationalized with the help of an agency-based supplier classification portfolio. It might be of particular value to firms to discuss those suppliers that scored high in risk of opportunism but did not (yet) reveal any signs of moral hazard. Finally, the strong explanatory power

of reputation alerts buyers to pay more attention to behavioral information on the (potential) supplier available in the market.

Originality/value: Analyzing the occurrence of moral hazard and including terminated relationships adds to the emerging stream of literature on relationship discontinuation in B2B markets. Further, the strong empirical results may encourage researchers to elaborate on principal-agent theory-based assumptions, adding another layer of explanation to buyer–supplier relationships. Findings show that reputation is unduly neglected as supplier selection criterion in current theory and practice.     

Using flexible schedules in the managerial world: The power of peers

Reports indicate that managers fail to take advantage of flexible work schedules to integrate work and life demands. A survey was conducted of approximately 1,000 managers who had three alternative schedule options: flextime, part‐time work, and leave of absence. Managers who were women or who had work group peers who were schedule users were more likely to use each schedule. Managers' productivity concerns were highest for flextime, then leaves, and least for part‐time work. Organizational cultural change can occur if managers take the lead in their work groups to use flexible schedules in order to remove social barriers. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

How Corporate Reputation Disclosures Affect Stakeholders’ Behavioral Intentions: Mediating Mechanisms of Perceived Organizational Performance and Corporate Reputation

Journal of Business Ethics - Corporate reputation is decisive for stakeholders’ supporting or repelling behavior and, therefore, one of firms’ most valuable intangible resources....