My vision of a better India

India is a rich country in which poor people live, a big country which does not realise its own potential. India must build on its strengths and achieve its potential to become an economic superpower with a good and just society. A number of attitudinal and structural factors, such as lack of national pride, politics based on caste and other identities, a hierarchic and corruption-ridden feudal society and the tendency to reward failure and weakness rather than success and achievement are the major hurdles that are stopping us from achieving our true potential. On the other hand, our strengths in democratically managing a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country and our capacity to master technology are also notable. Steps and hopeful developments that show the way forward to solve our national problems and realise the vision of a better India are suggested.     

Regime Shifts in Asian Equity and Real Estate Markets

This paper applies a new statistical technology for identifying regime shifts to analyze recent data on real estate and equity markets in eight developing Far Eastern countries in the 1992–1998 time period. We find that regime shifts in volatility occur in the summer of 1997; however, most of the regime shifts in returns occur in the spring of 1998. While the clustering of regime breaks does not seem to follow any obvious pattern, the country's exposure to trade and firm leverage are important. An analysis of Granger causality suggests that, in most cases, equity returns cause real estate returns but the converse is not true. We also find two-way causality in volatility, suggesting that a common factor drives volatility in these markets. Finally, we provide evidence that the regime shifts generally imply higher relative risk for real estate securities after the estimated breaks.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

The political economy of quality measurement: a case study of the USA slaughter cattle market

As agricultural products move from being economic commodities to quality–differentiated goods, price dispersion within specific markets increases and implicit subsidies from high quality producers to low quality producers are removed. The present paper examines how these distributional effects can influence patterns of support and opposition to changes in marketing arrangements. The simple model developed is calibrated using data from the USA slaughter cattle market. Estimates of the impact on prices of measuring quality more accurately are found to be similar in size to previous estimates of market power price suppression in the market.