Principal‐agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

Effort provision in tournaments may depend on both social preferences towards the competitor and social preferences towards the principal who designed the tournament. In a laboratory experiment, we analyze agents' behavior in different tournament settings that vary the distribution of the prize between agents. The principal chooses between a low and a high guaranteed payment. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Instead, our results show that both the generosity of the principal and the strict separation between winner and loser increase the effort level in tournaments. Moreover, agents focus their preferences either on the principal or on the agent. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economic policy uncertainty and financial statement comparability

We examine the implications of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) for financial statement comparability. We posit that the increased difficulty of estimating future cash flows and the increased opportunity for earnings management with increased EPU reduce the quality of earnings and its comparability. Consistent with this reasoning, we find a negative relation between earnings comparability and lagged EPU. Further, the association between EPU and comparability is more negative for firms that have poorer accruals quality and higher earnings volatility. We do not find that accounting policy choice is systematically related to the association between EPU and comparability. These results suggest that cross-sectional differences in accounting estimates rather than accounting policies influence the relation between EPU and comparability.     

Land‐use change trajectories up to 2050: insights from a global agro‐economic model comparison

Changes in agricultural land use have important implications for environmental services. Previous studies of agricultural land‐use futures have been published indicating large uncertainty due to different model assumptions and methodologies. In this article we present a first comprehensive comparison of global agro‐economic models that have harmonized drivers of population, GDP, and biophysical yields. The comparison allows us to ask two research questions: (1) How much cropland will be used under different socioeconomic and climate change scenarios? (2) How can differences in model results be explained? The comparison includes four partial and six general equilibrium models that differ in how they model land supply and amount of potentially available land. We analyze results of two different socioeconomic scenarios and three climate scenarios (one with constant climate). Most models (7 out of 10) project an increase of cropland of 10–25% by 2050 compared to 2005 (under constant climate), but one model projects a decrease. Pasture land expands in some models, which increase the treat on natural vegetation further. Across all models most of the cropland expansion takes place in South America and sub‐Saharan Africa. In general, the strongest differences in model results are related to differences in the costs of land expansion, the endogenous productivity responses, and the assumptions about potential cropland.     

PORTFOLIOS WITH RESERVE COEFFICIENT

This article offers an attempt at defining and computing the coherence of, and substitution among, the standard instruments of monetary policy, viz. open market policy, rate of interest, and reserve coefficient. A number of separation theorems are proved and a unit-elasticity rule derived for the tradeoff between the reserve coefficient and the premium on risky assets. Finally, for any given interest rate we select an optimal portfolio by the maximal-caution criterion, which minimizes the probability of failure.     

Leadership and cooperation in growing teams

We study how the growth of teams affects leadership effectiveness and intragroup cooperation. We put experimental participants in two teams. In each team, the members voluntarily contribute to a club good. In one of the two teams, the members observe the contribution of a randomly chosen leader before they decide themselves. Two treatments allow for migration between the teams. In one of them, participants control access to their team with a voting process. By design, participants can achieve the efficient outcome only if they all move into one team. We compare the results with a leaderless setting as well as with four treatments which vary team size exogenously. The results show that high contributions of leaders encourage higher per-capita contributions of their followers which foster migration into their teams. In turn, larger teams experience even more courageous leadership and higher contributions, but the coordination effect diminishes. Nevertheless, the dismissal of potential newcomers in the treatment with voting suggests that team members see a trade-off between team size and contributions. They sacrifice economic benefits from potential entrants to maintain intrateam cooperation.