A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems

In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of the weighted Shapley value of the optimistic TU game associated with a minimum cost spanning tree problem. This characterization is based on two monotonicity properties, population monotonicity (if a new agent joint the society nobody is worse off) and the strong cost monotonicity (if the connection cost between any pair of agents increases nobody is better off), and weighted share of extra costs (the extra costs should be divided proportionally to the weights of the agents).      

Measuring and Understanding Productivity in UK Market Services

Many productivity studies, if they cover the service sector,commonly enter a caveat that the data are uncertain or justlook at manufacturing. This paper attempts to clarify what UKmarket-service-sector data are available, whether they shouldbe treated as inaccurate, and what conceptual problems mightmake measuring service-sector output so hard. Our overall conclusionis that most problems surround financial intermediation andbusiness services. In financial intermediation, national accountsconventions and adjustments make the output data very hard tointerpret. In business services many of the output measuresare employment based. Elsewhere, for example, retail and wholesaletrade, transport, and hotels and restaurants, the main problemis, in practice, lack of collected deflators. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: g.a.crespi{at}sussex.ac.uk; chiara.criscuolo{at}ons.gsi.gov.uk;j.e.haskel{at}qmul.ac.uk; d.hawkes{at}ioe.ac.uk     

Stochastic vs. deterministic frontier distance output function: Evidence from Brazilian higher education institutions

Journal of Productivity Analysis - Using data from the Brazilian Higher Education Census and other public institutions, this study aims to obtain and compare efficiency scores from stochastic...     

Unfair inequality and growth*

Fighting against economic inequality is one fundamental social goal in the agendas of most governments. However, recent studies highlight that people actually prefer unequal societies, as they accept inequality generated by an individual's effort and wish to reduce only unfair inequality (generated by factors beyond an individual's control). This distinction might help to explain the fundamental unsolved question about whether inequality is good or bad for growth: unfair inequality (UI) could be growth-deterring, while fair inequality (FI) might be growth-enhancing. We derive a reduced-form growth equation from a stylized overlapping-generations model with human capital that includes FI, UI, and poverty. Then, using an instrumental variable approach, we show for alternative samples and inequality measures at the worldwide level that the estimated coefficient associated with UI is always negative, while the coefficient of total inequality increases when UI is included in the regression. Moreover, we find that poverty mediates this relationship because the higher the poverty rate, the smaller the impact of either type of inequality on growth.     

Deceitful when insecure: The effect of self-efficacy beliefs on the use of deception in negotiations

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship.