The finance-investment and saving-funding circuit in the closed and open economies with government

This contribution discusses the Finance-Investment and Saving-Funding (FISF) circuit regarding the closed and open economies with government. Moreover, we discuss the fiscal policy effects on aggregate demand and income in the FISF circuit context. Keynes explained the FISF circuit assuming a closed economy without government. The novelty of the current contribution is to analyze the abovementioned circuit in the closed and open economy context including government. We show that the basic features of the FISF circuit remain unchanged for the closed and open economies when government is considered in the circuit.     

Stochastic vs. deterministic frontier distance output function: Evidence from Brazilian higher education institutions

Journal of Productivity Analysis - Using data from the Brazilian Higher Education Census and other public institutions, this study aims to obtain and compare efficiency scores from stochastic...     

Autocracy,democracy and trade policy

This paper develops a politico-economic model for use in studying the role of intra-elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country's political regime, trade policy and income-tax-based redistribution scheme. Three socioeconomic groups are involved: two elite groups and workers, whose preferences regarding trade policy and income taxation are derived from a simple open-economy model. The critical point is that income taxation induces a rich–poor/elite–workers political cleavage, while trade policy opens the door to intra-elite conflict. In this model, when there is no intra-elite conflict, changes in trade policy are associated with political transitions. Coups (democratizations) open up the economy if and only if both elite groups are pro-free-trade (protectionist). However, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade policy and reallocating political power within the elite (to the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers) rather than offering to democratize the country. The change in trade policy is credible because the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers controls the autocracy. Moreover, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, coups tend to result in the maintenance of the existing trade policy unless popular demands are extremely radical and/or the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers is exceptionally weak.     

Analysis of the emergency service applying the queueing theory

Those responsible for the decision-making in hospitals are becoming more aware of the need to efficiently manage hospital systems. One option is the queueing models. In this work, the Emergency service of a public hospital is analyzed by applying the concepts and relations of queues. Based on the results of the model, it is concluded that the Emergency area does not count with the minimum number of doctors necessary for a constant flow of patients. The minimum number of doctors necessary to satisfy the current and future service demand, with the same service times and service disciplines, is calculated using the model. The analytical models allow to directly understand the existing relations between service demand, number of doctors and the attention priority of the patient seen as a system of queues. The work is of use to managers and those responsible for the management of hospital systems.     

Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Based on well-known evidence on labor supply elasticities, several authors have concluded that women should be taxed at lower rates than men. We evaluate the quantitative implications and merits of this proposition. Relative to the current system of taxation, setting a proportional tax rate on married females equal to 4% (8%) increases output and married female labor force participation by about 3.9% (3.4%) and 6.9% (4.0%), respectively. Gender-based taxes improve welfare and are preferred by a majority of households. Nevertheless, welfare gains are higher when the U.S. tax system is replaced by a proportional, gender-neutral income tax.     

Dependent and Accountable: Evidence from the Modern Theory of Central Banking

In this paper we take another look at the literature on central bank independence. We show that the representative-agent approach to monetary policy is seriously flawed and does not provide a sound basis for deriving institutional solutions to the inflationary-bias. We then argue that the political approach to monetary policy provides a better account of the inflationary-bias and that this has important implications for the set-up of institutional arrangements, like central-bank independence, and the role of contractual arrangements, like indexation. Central bank independence, if appropriately modeled, can fail to reduce inflationary pressures in plausible circumstances. We then identify some issues in the theory of central banking that have not been clearly resolved and we offer some intuition as to the way they could be studied. We conclude by showing some potentially worrisome implications for the future of the European Monetary Union.     

Productivity, exporting, and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis: direct evidence from UK firms

Abstract.  Case studies suggest exporters learn from clients. Econometric evidence is mixed. We use firm-level panel data on exporting and productivity with direct information on learning sources, including clients. We find: (a) firms who exported in the past are likely to learn more from clients (relative to other sources); (b) firms who learned from clients in the past are more likely to have faster productivity growth; (c) the reverse is not the case; that is, past productivity growth is not associated with more learning from clients and past learning from clients is not associated with more exporting. These results are consistent with the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.