Do Auctions and Forced Divestitures Increase Competition? Evidence for Retail Gasoline Markets

To foster competition, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate, or by imposing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and imposing divestitures of such stations on the four major companies. We evaluate this policy experiment and find that the auctioning of licenses without an obligation to divest has no discernible effect on prices. An obligation to divest lowers prices by 1.3–2.3% at divested sites. Moreover, prices decrease by 0.9–1.2% at sites nearby. This suggests that the observed price decreases are at least partly due to competitive spillovers.     

The impact of monetary policy on the financing behaviour of firms in the Euro area and the UK

Abstract

According to the ‘broad credit view’ bank-dependent firms are more strongly affected by monetary contractions than firms with access to non-bank forms of external finance. Within the credit view the bank lending channel focuses on the special role of bank loans, and predicts that monetary contractions reduce loan supply to firms facing information problems. However, the ‘relationship lending channel’ argues that, especially in bank-based economies, bank-dependent firms have close ties with banks, which may reduce the sensitivity of their use of bank debt to monetary shocks. The sensitivity of corporate debt structures to changes in the monetary policy stance is analysed using a sample of 22,000 firms in the Euro area and the UK. Evidence is found for the credit view, the relationship lending channel, but not for the bank lending channel.     

The (UN)importance of public debt: A review essay

Summary In this article the debate on the consequences of the creation and existence of government debt is reviewed, using two recent books as a guideline. Four issues in particular are discussed: the correct definition and measurement of government debt, the discussion on the (in)effectiveness of fiscal policy, the inflationary consequences of public debt and finally the influence of government deficits on financial markets. It follows from our review of the debate that there exists as yet no consensus among economists on these issues.The author would like to thank Professor S.K. Kuipers, Professor J. Pen, Dr. C.G.M. Sterks and Professor J. Weitenberg for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Central bank independence,inflation and political instability in developing countries

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.     

Market Timing and Capital Structure: Evidence for Dutch Firms

Summary We examine market timing and its effects on capital structures for a sample of Dutch listed firms and a sub-sample of Dutch initial public offering (IPO) firms. The results yield evidence of market timing. Stock price run-ups increase the probabilities of equity and dual issues. Further, the effects of stock price run-ups on the choices between issuance of debt, equity or both are consistent with the predictions of the market timing hypothesis. However, in contrast to the existing evidence for US firms, we do not find persistent effects of market timing on capital structures of Dutch firms. This paper has benefited from useful comments from two anonymous referees, Allard Bruinshoofd, Frank de Jong, Jeroen Ligterink, seminar participants at De Nederlandsche Bank, and discussions at the 6th ONS Analysis of Enterprise Microdata Conference (Cardiff 2005).