The influence of ownership structure on internationalization

Common reasons mentioned for a firm's internationalization are related to advantages for the firm. However, if firms are conceptualized as political coalitions, this view does not seem to be sufficient to explain why and to what extent firms internationalize. A principal-agent theoretical approach focusing the ownership-stake-related motivations and bargaining power of owners plus the range of actions managers can employ in different ownership situations offers an alternative explanation. We consequently studied the influences of ownership structure – defined as the concentration of ownership – on a firm's degree of internationalization and the main regions of international diversification. Overall, we conclude that the relationship is non-linear. To test our hypotheses, we utilize panel data for the 102 largest German manufacturing firms from 1990 to 2006. The analysis confirms our assumptions.     

Aufstocker – Kein Indiz für ein Niedriglohnproblem

Immer mehr Erwerbst?tige erhalten zus?tzlich zu ihrem Einkommen Leistungen durch den Staat. Um welche Leistungen handelt es sich dabei? Welche Familiensituation liegt bei diesen Aufstockern vor? Wodurch ist der Anstieg der Aufstockerzahlen verursacht? Dr. Hendrik Luchtmeier, 38, ist Referent im Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie; Johannes Ziemendorff, 27, M.Sc. Wirtschaftswissenschaften ist Stipendiat am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.     

A central limit theorem for the Hellinger loss of Grenander‐type estimators

We consider Grenander‐type estimators for a monotone function , obtained as the slope of a concave (convex) estimate of the primitive of λ. Our main result is a central limit theorem for the Hellinger loss, which applies to estimation of a probability density, a regression function or a failure rate. In the case of density estimation, the limiting variance of the Hellinger loss turns out to be independent of λ.     

Pricing and risk of swing contracts in natural gas markets

Review of Derivatives Research - Motivated by the growing importance of swing contracts in natural gas markets, this article extends the literature on commodity price modelling as well as valuation...     

Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An International Test for Leviathan Accounting for Unmeasured Economic Activity

Tests for the presence of Leviathan, evidenced by a positive relationship between the size of government measured as a percentage of GDP, and the degree of fiscal centralization, have provided mixed results. We derive alternative measures of the size of government taking into account household and informal market activity. Traditional Leviathan models are then re-estimated for an international sample of forty-five countries. Controlling for income, population, intergovernmental grants, and urbanization we test whether fiscal centralization is responsible for the relative size of government. We find no evidence of a relationship between fiscal centralization and government size.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

Organizational complexity and participatory innovation: participatory budgeting in local government

ABSTRACT

In this study, we examined the relationship between organizational complexity and the adoption of participatory innovation in German municipal government. We proposed that organizations with more complex organizational structures are more likely to adopt participatory innovation. We investigated municipalities (N = 394) of the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia and used participatory budgeting as an indicator for innovation. Our results indicate that organizational complexity expressed by functional differentiation has a positive relationship with the occurrence of participatory innovation. The results inform a debate about the value trade-offs that are inherent to the structural design of public organizations.