A stranger in a strange land: Micro political risk and the multinational firm

When a firm chooses to enter or continue business in a foreign market, it becomes exposed to associated political risks which should be assessed and managed. Help is available for becoming aware of the level of macro political risk; that is, the political risk across industries or all businesses in entire countries or geographic regions. Yet, surprisingly little guidance exists by which to identify and assess firm-specific political risks, termed micro political risk. Herein, we offer some new perspectives on the nature of micro political risk within a host country, illustrating how it stems from economic, societal, and governmental forces. We have compiled a number of firm-specific variables which can affect the firm’s micro political risk profile, and advance an innovative methodology by which executives can address these variables and develop an assessment of their firm’s micro political risk. Examples of micro political risk situations are provided, along with discussion of implementing the proposed methodology.     

The macroeconomic consequences of disasters

Natural disasters have a statistically observable adverse impact on the macro-economy in the short-run and costlier events lead to more pronounced slowdowns in production. Yet, interestingly, developing countries, and smaller economies, face much larger output declines following a disaster of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies. A close study of the determinants of these adverse macroeconomic output costs reveals several interesting patterns. Countries with a higher literacy rate, better institutions, higher per capita income, higher degree of openness to trade, and higher levels of government spending are better able to withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the macro-economy. These all suggest an increased ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction. Financial conditions also seem to be of importance; countries with more foreign exchange reserves, and higher levels of domestic credit, but with less-open capital accounts appear more robust and better able to endure natural disasters, with less adverse spillover into domestic production.     

An Examination of International Retail Franchising in Emerging Markets

There has been an urgent call from both the franchise industry and the academic community for research on world franchising markets, specifically in the retail sector. This article is an attempt to summarize the main research that has been conducted thus far on international retail franchising. The article begins with an overview of the development of the literature and then discusses the nature and scope of emerging markets, with particular reference to their impact on the stakeholders of international retail franchising. Next, the article develops a conceptual model relating international retail franchising to its stakeholders. Then, a review of the research is divided into the areas of emerging world market: Central and Eastern Europe, Mexico and South America, Asia, and other areas that include India, Kuwait, and South Africa. The article concludes by discussing the next step to developing a research base for further understanding of emerging markets in addition to the opportunities and challenges for retail franchising and future research.     

Arbitrage and Growth Rate for Riskless Investments in a Stationary Economy

A sequential investment is a vector of payments over time, ( a ₀, a ₁, ... , a_n ), where a payment is made to or by the investor according as a_i is positive or negative. Given a collection of such investments it may be possible to assemble a portfolio from which an investor can get "something for nothing," meaning that without investing any money of his own he can receive a positive return after some finite number of time periods. Cantor and Lipmann (1995) have given a simple necessary and sufficient condition for a set of investments to have this property. We present a short proof of this result. If arbitrage is not possible, our result leads to a simple derivation of the expression for the long–run growth rate of the set of investments in terms of its "internal rate of return."     

The cournot duopoly model reconsidered in the presence of costly communication and enforcement agreements

Recently I proposed a general notion of equilibrium for n-person games which is based on mutual threats and promises (responses), and which leads, in general, to a determinate solution with respect to the order of choice moves. The nature of the solution set in our model is a function of the action sets, the payoff functions, and the cost of ‘communication and enforcement of agreements’ (C&E). The main concern of this paper is to show that the Cournot duopoly solution, for the case of a linear demand function facing two identical firms, can be regenerated by our solution concept under a certain assumption about a high cost C&E. On the other hand, it is shown that under a relatively low cost of C&E the Cournot/Nash solution does not belong to our solution set, because it is Pareto inferior for both duopolists relative to some solutions in our set, among them, the standard monopoly solution.