The association between management earnings forecasts, earnings management, and stock market valuation: Evidence from French IPOs

This study investigates managers' motivations to engage in earnings management through purposeful interventions in the setting of discretionary accruals, in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) in France. Firms issuing forecasts in their prospectuses are expected to differ from nonforecasters in the level of earnings management during the year following the public offering. Within the context of contracting theory, four research questions are addressed. First, are IPO firms issuing forecasts more inclined to manage earnings 1 year after an IPO compared to nonforecasting firms? Second, is a forecasting firm's level of earnings management conditioned by earnings-forecast deviation? Third, is earnings management by IPO forecasting firms affected by contractual and governance environments? Fourth, how do investors see through earnings management following IPO earnings forecasts, i.e., how do stock market participants value earnings components (i.e., nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals)? Our findings document that in the year following an IPO, the magnitude of earnings management is much higher for forecasters than for nonforecasters. Results also show that a firm's accrual behavior is affected by earnings-forecast deviation, but the relationship is moderated by contractual and governance constraints. Finally, it would appear that French investors do not adequately readjust the relationship between reported earnings and a firm's market value for the year in which earnings are subject to manipulations.     

Asymmetry in first‐price auctions with affiliated private values

Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first‐price auctions with affiliated private values. Considering two types of bidders, we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution. We establish the identification of the model, characterize its theoretical restrictions, and propose a two‐step non‐parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions. An empirical analysis of joint bidding in OCS auctions is provided. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm-Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian-linked employer–employee panel data, our findings show that firm-level agreements increase both wage costs and labour productivity (with respect to sector-level agreements). Relying on approaches developed by Bartolucci and Hellerstein et al., they also indicate that firm-level agreements exert a stronger impact on wages than on productivity, so that profitability is hampered. However, this rent-sharing effect mostly holds in sectors where firms are more concentrated or less exposed to international competition. Firm agreements are thus mainly found to raise wages beyond labour productivity when the rents to be shared between workers and firms are relatively big. Overall, this suggests that firm-level agreements benefit both employers and employees — through higher productivity and wages — without being very detrimental to firms’ performance.     

Dairy food consumption,supply, and policy in Japan

We investigate Japanese dairy markets. We first provide an overview of consumer demand and how it evolved after World War II. Using historical data and econometric estimates of Japanese dairy demand, we identify economic, cultural and demographic forces that have been shaping consumption patterns. Then we summarize the characteristics of Japanese milk production and dairy processing and policies affecting them. We then describe the import regime and trade flows in dairy products. The paper concludes with policy recommendations of how to reform the Japanese dairy sector.     

Information Acquisition and Choice Under Uncertainty

This paper presents a model where individuals have imperfect information and there is an opportunity cost of learning. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect costly information before taking an action has a systematic effect on choices. More precisely, consider two alternatives with ex ante identical expected payoff but different variances. The model predicts that, after the learning process is stopped, a majority of individuals will select the alternative with largest payoff-variance. The result persists when agents have multiple sources of information. Applications to entrepreneurial investments, composition of advisory committees, and judicial decision-making are discussed.     

The paradox of resource vulnerability: Considerations for organizational curatorship

Resource‐based scholars have focused on the properties of resources and the isolating mechanisms that sustain their rents in the face of competition. Unfortunately, they have devoted far less attention to the sources of vulnerability of many of these resources. We argue that, paradoxically, sources of rent such as isolating mechanisms often have a dark side that renders resources more vulnerable. We highlight three categories of challenges to managing resource vulnerability—protecting them from erosion, coping with their ambiguity, and preserving their required alignment—and identify sources of vulnerability within each. We address these via three primary functions of curatorship: preservation, connoisseurship, and orchestration, respectively. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is there a pilot in the chain? Identifying the key drivers of change in the fresh pineapple sector

High-value export-oriented agriculture is today considered as a means of integrating smallholders into the world economy. This paper examines the geographic and organisational changes that have taken place in the fresh pineapple sector over the past 50 years. We begin with a historical analysis of the changes in leadership among producer countries, namely the dethroning of Côte d’Ivoire by Costa Rica. We show that this geographical shift has been accompanied by massive organisational changes: the pineapple sector is increasingly driven by large downstream actors who derive their power from the ability to impose their definition of quality to the whole chain, and from economies of scale and scope. Although varietal innovation plays a key role throughout the period, commercial and logistical innovation are of increasing strategic importance. However, because of the constraints imposed by the concerned supply chains, small farmers risk being excluded or marginalized.     

Auctions with ex post uncertainty

Uncertainty about ex post realized values is an inherent component in many auction environments. In this article, we develop a structural framework to analyze auction data subject to ex post uncertainty as a pure risk. We consider a low‐price sealed‐bid auction model with heterogeneous bidders' preferences and ex post uncertainty. The uncertainty can be common to all bidders or idiosyncratic. We derive the model restrictions and study nonparametric and semiparametric identification of the model primitives under exogenous and endogenous participation. We then develop multistep nonparametric and semiparametric estimation procedures in both cases.     

Governance and the decision to issue a profit warning

The theoretical concept of agency costs developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (2005) are used to study the relationship between the quality of a firm's governance and its decision to issue a profit warning (PW) when it is overvalued. Based on a sample of Canadian companies between 2000 and 2004, results were only partially supportive of the hypotheses. The characteristics of the board seem to play only a secondary role in the decision to issue a profit warning when the firm is overvalued. On the other hand, as expected, governance mechanisms that factor in market values to align the interests of managers and directors with those of shareholders are negatively related to the profit warning decision. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous job specialization

According to some authors, technical change contributes to the explanation of the increase in equilibrium unemployment by making jobs more and more specialized. Here, we assume that firms optimally adapt the specialization of jobs to overall labour market conditions. Using a matching labour market framework, we show that the increase in unemployment can explain the higher specialization of jobs.