The theory of value and earnings,and an introduction to the Ball-Brown analysis*

Abstract. The paper develops a simple and parsimonious model that relates earnings and unexpected earnings to market returns. The analysis emphasizes that any model under uncertainty must be consistent with the theory of value, earnings, and dividends under certainty (i.e., Hicksian income theory). An extension of this theory exists such that the model subsumes uncertainty. The Hicksian approach is useful because it embeds key dividend irrelevancy concepts due to Modigliani and Miller (1961), and these can be retained under uncertainty. An interesting empirical proposition can be inferred from the model: earnings, rather than the change in earnings, ought to serve as a premier exploratory variable of returns. This contention is consistent with some recent empirical findings due to Easton and Harris (1991). Résumé. L'auteur élabore un modèle simple et parcimonieux qui relie les bénéfices, et les bénéfices imprévus, aux rendements du marché. L'analyse met en relief le fait que tout modèle en situation d'incertitude doit être conforme á la théorie de la valeur, des bénéfices et des dividendes en situation de certitude (c'est-á-dire la théorie hicksienne des bénéfices). Cette théorie peut être élargie de telle sorte que le modèle tienne compte de l'incertitude. L'utilité de l'approche hicksienne tient au fait qu'elle englobe les concepts clés de non-pertinence relatifs au dividende que l'on attribue á Modigliani et Miller. et que ces concepts peuvent être appliqués en situation d'incertitude. Ce modèle permet de formuler une proposition empirique intéressante: les bénéfices, plutôt que l'évolution des bénéfices, doivent servir de première variable exploratoire des rendements. Cette affirmation est conforme aux résultats empiriques récemment obtenus pas Easton et Harris.     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

The sensitivity of financial distress prediction models to departures from normality*

Abstract. This research empirically investigated the effect of nonnormality on financial stress prediction. The analysis included the application of probit, logit and multiple discriminant analysis to prediction models found in previous literature, and also involved separate samples for both bankrupt and problem-status companies. Finally, the statistical techniques were evaluated under extreme conditions of nonnormality. Two basic procedures were used to modify the ratio distributions to achieve normality. These included a square-root transformation procedure and an outlier deletion procedure. Results were compared using both a univariate and a multivariate technique to identify and remove outliers. The results indicate the general sensitivity of the multiple discriminant analysis technique to departures from normality and the sensitivity of the logit and probit techniques to extreme nonnormality. The data indicate that researchers interested in assessing classification accuracy might benefit by testing for distributional sensitivity using procedures outlined in this research. Resumé. Les auteurs ont procédé à une analyse empirique de l'incidence des écarts par rapport à la normalité sur la prévision des contraintes financières. L'analyse comporte l'application du probit, du logit et de l'analyse à discriminants multiples aux modèles prévisionnnels que l'on trouve dans des publications, et l'on a eu recours à des échantillons distincts tant pour les sociétés en situation de faillite que pour les sociétés en difficulté. Enfin, les techniques statistiques ont été évaluees dans des conditions extrêmes d'écart par rapport à la normalité. Deux méthodes fondamentales ont été utilisées pour modifier les distributions de ratios de façon à parvenir à la normalité. Ces méthodes comprennent un procédé de transformation de la racine carrée et un procédé d'élimination des éléments isolés. Les résultats obtenus ont été comparés à l'aide d'une technique univariée ainsi que d'une technique multivariée pour repérer et supprimer les éléments isolés. Les résultats indiquent la sensibilité générale de la technique d'analyse à discriminants multiples aux déviations par rapport à la normalité et la sensibilité des techniques logit et probit aux écarts extrêmes par rapport à la normalité. Ces données révèlent que les chercheurs qui s'intéressent à l'évaluation de l'axactitude de la classification pourraient tirer profit d'une vérification de la sensibilité de la distribution au moyen des méthodes décrites par les auteurs.     

How Friedman and Schwartz Became Monetarists

During the early‐1940s, both Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz downplayed the role of money in the economy. By the mid‐1950s, they had not only become what later were called monetarists, but the findings from their joint work defined monetarism. The key factor underlying the change in their views was what they learned from their study of U.S. historical experience, especially their empirical confirmation of the Fed's role in the Great Depression. Here, the influence of Clark Warburton on Friedman's thinking loomed large. We document Friedman's advocacy of the constant‐money‐growth rule as an outgrowth of his and Schwartz's empirical research.